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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Household Finance
by
Tong-yob Nam
Chair: John Laitner
This dissertation studies household saving and investment decisions in a variety of circum-
stances. Every individual faces various types of risk such as housing, labor income, and
longevity risk. My dissertation focuses on the combined effects of such risks on household
saving and investment behavior.
The first chapter of the dissertation investigates the effects of housing and labor income
risk on household stock investment behavior. Housing market risk is geographically het-
erogeneous in that house price growth rate and its correlations with stock return and local
labor growth rate vary widely across regions. In the presence of housing market risk, which
is not easily diversifiable due to a special characteristic of houses as a residence, households
adjust their stock share according to local housing market risk. Households in areas where
the housing market risk is higher tend to respond by holding less stock in their portfolios,
although this tendency weakens after retirement when labor income risk disappears. This
finding suggests that housing market risk exerts more influence on household portfolio choice
when it is combined with labor income risk.
In the second chapter, the effect of retirement on portfolio choice is examined. The
conventional wisdom suggests that, when labor income is reduced, households should hold
xi
more safe assets in their portfolios after retirement. However, little theoretical consensus has
been reached and empirical evidence has been scarce to evaluate this argument. This chapter
provides empirical evidence that the retirement has a causal effect on portfolio choice. The
household level panel data and the instrumental variable approach are used to deal with
endogeneity problem and identify the casual effect of retirement. The result shows that the
retirement causes a 5-7 percent increase in risky shares in households portfolio.
The third chapter examines the cash-out mortgage refinancing behavior and its effect on
portfolio rebalancing. Owing to the expansion of mortgage market and low mortgage interest
rate in the early 2000s, households cashed out a large amount of home equity. Cashed-
out households reduce their home equity actively, thus rebalancing their portfolios. This
rebalancing effect, however, is offset due to aggressive investments in other real estate. As
households increased their real estate holdings using cashed-out home equity, they enjoyed a
greater leveraging effect in real estate investment during the booming housing market, while
household portfolios became more vulnerable to housing market risk.
xii
CHAPTER I
Geographic Heterogeneity in Housing Market Risk and
Portfolio Choice
1.1 Introduction
The effect of housing on portfolio choice has been examined from various perspectives (e.g.,
Grossman and Laroque, 1990; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Cocco, 2005; Yao and Zhang ,
2005). While those studies find the effect of housing on household portfolio choice to be
significant, most of them have considered housing as a homogeneous asset, that is, every
household expects housing investment to be associated with the same return and volatility.
Depending on the housing location, however, households are exposed to totally different
housing market risk. If such regional variation in housing market risk prevails, do household
portfolio choices vary across regions?
In this paper, I show that households in areas where the housing market risk is higher
tend to respond by holding less stock in their portfolios, although this tendency weakens
after retirement when labor income risk disappears. This finding is explained by focusing on
three aspects of housing market risk: the volatility of house price growth rate, the correlation
between house price growth rate and stock return, and the correlation between house price
growth rate and labor income growth rate. While housing market risk varies significantly
across regions, I find that the correlation between house price growth rate and labor income
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growth rate has, on average, a dominant effect on portfolio choice. The main contribution
of this paper is to shed light on the effects of local housing and labor market conditions on
household finance. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the joint
effect of local housing market risk and labor income risk on household portfolio choice.
Household optimal portfolio allocation varies with housing market risk due to the special
characteristics of housing investment. Housing assets play a dual role as investments and
illiquid durable consumption goods, and individuals, whether they rent or own, need a place
to live. The role of housing asset as a residence renders housing market risk hard to avoid
and not readily diversifiable. Furthermore, adjusting housing investment incurs significant
cost because housing asset is indivisible and relocation involves both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs. The housing market risk, therefore, dictates that households allocate their
portfolio strategically so as to maintain an optimal level of overall risk to their total wealth.
The location of the primary residence, to a large extent, determines the housing market
risk to which a household is exposed. Unlike other investments such as stocks and bonds,
house prices are greatly affected by such region-specific factors as local population growth, lo-
cal income growth, and land constraints. Thus, house price dynamics and attendant housing
market risk vary greatly across regions. The choice of the location of the primary residence
exposes a household to that area’s region-specific housing market risk.
Regional variation in housing market risk is largely explained by housing supply elasticity.
In areas where housing supply elasticity is low, house price growth rate is more volatile. When
an aggregate demand shock occurs, house prices respond more sensitively to the shock in
areas with low housing supply elasticity. Such response causes the volatility of house price
growth rate to increase. In other words, low housing supply elasticity amplifies the effect
of aggregate shocks on house prices. The amplifying effect of housing supply elasticity, in
turn, affects how house price growth rate is correlated with stock return and labor income
growth rate. While stock prices and labor income directly affect housing demand, the shift in
demand is reflected in the house prices to a greater extent in areas with low housing supply
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elasticity. House price is thus more positively correlated with stock price and labor income
in such areas.
Using Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level house price and labor income data, and
nationwide stock price index, I do confirm that house price growth rate is more volatile, and
is more strongly and positively correlated with stock return and local labor income growth
rate where housing supply elasticity is low. Because of the high volatility and the high
positive correlation, households in these areas are exposed to higher housing market risk.
Given that housing market risk varies significantly across regions, especially with housing
supply elasticity, I empirically test how this regional variation in housing market risk affects
household portfolio choice using two identification strategies. First, I use housing supply
elasticity as a measure of local housing market risk. This identification strategy offers an
important advantage over the use of conventional risk measures as explanatory variables.
Conventional risk measures only partially portray future housing market risk as they are
based on historical data, and easily tainted by temporary economic shocks. Housing supply
elasticity, on the other hand, is the principal cause of fundamental mechanism by which
future housing market risk is determined, and seldom changes over time since it is deter-
mined mainly by intrinsic geographic characteristics. Housing supply elasticity thus better
represents the local housing market risk in the sense that the portfolio allocation is deter-
mined mostly by future expectation on housing market risk, not by the past performance
nor temporary changes in the housing market.
Secondly, retirement status is used as an identifier of labor income risk. Retirement is
usually characterized by the absence of participation in the labor market. Labor income
uncertainty is not of concern to retirees who derive their income mostly from social security
benefits, pension plans, and annuities. In this sense, retirement status is a good proxy for
labor income risk. Using these two identifiers, I am able to distinguish the effect only of
housing risk from the combined effect of housing and labor income risk.
Empirical analysis finds that households located in areas with low housing supply elastic-
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ity, that face higher housing market risk, hold less stock in their portfolios. After retirement,
however, the difference in stock shares between high-risk and low-risk areas diminishes as
local housing market risk exerts less influence on portfolio choice. This finding suggests that
the effect of the correlation between house price and labor income dominates portfolio choice.
Owing to the special characteristics of housing assets as durable consumption goods, house
price volatility and its correlation with stock price affect households differently depending
on their current housing share and housing preference. Therefore, on average, the sole ef-
fect of housing risk is indeterminate. When house price is positively correlated with labor
income, however, every household faces an additional consideration of liquidity constraints.
For instance, when labor income drops unexpectedly, households usually try to borrow to
smooth their consumption. Due to the positive correlation, however, home equity is reduced
together with labor income. In such an event, households lose one of the most important
borrowing channels. Experiencing an unexpected labor income drop and losing home equity
concurrently, households in the low supply elasticity areas may suffer more from negative
aggregate shocks. Considering the risk from liquidity constraints, it is optimal for households
in such areas to hold relatively less stock shares in liquid assets, especially when they are
employed.
Portfolio rebalancing behavior of relocating households also indicates that households
respond to housing market risk by adjusting their stock shares. The housing market risk to
which households are exposed changes significantly when they move to other MSA. Measuring
change in housing market risk by the difference in housing supply elasticities before and after
moving, I examine whether a change in housing market risk causes a corresponding change
in household portfolio allocation. From relocating household sample, I find that households
tend to reduce their stock shares when they move to areas where housing market risk is
higher. The opposite is true with households that move to low-risk areas. This result
remains significant even after controlling for other post-moving status changes including
change in wealth, income, and housing share.
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The effect of housing assets on portfolio choice has been examined from various perspec-
tives. Grossman and Laroque (1990) examine optimal consumption and portfolio allocation
when consumption takes the form of illiquid durable goods such as housing assets. While
they reject the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) because of the
illiquidity of durable goods, they confirm that the standard one-factor capital asset pric-
ing model (CAPM) holds even in the presence of illiquid durable consumption goods. On
the other hand, Cocco (2005) uses a life cycle model in which households generate util-
ity from both non-durable consumption goods and housing services, to show that housing
plays an important role in determining the composition of a household’s portfolio. Yao and
Zhang (2005) also examine the effect of housing assets on portfolio choice using a life cycle
model. However, they allow households to choose to rent instead of owning a house. In their
model, households that rent tend to invest more in stocks. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) use
a mean-variance efficiency framework to show the optimal portfolio choice of homeowners
with different home equity shares in total wealth.
While the literature finds the importance of the housing asset in household investment de-
cisions both empirically and theoretically, these studies do not consider a variation in housing
market characteristics across regions, driven mainly by geographic constraints. This paper
explores how variation in local housing market risk affects household portfolio choice. It also
examines whether the effect of labor income risk on portfolio choice is altered as the rela-
tionship between labor income risk and house price dynamics varies across regions. Drawing
on empirical evidence based on household level data and supporting theoretical background,
this paper demonstrates that geographic variation in housing market risk significantly affects
household portfolio choice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I examine the geographic
heterogeneity in US housing market and the role of housing supply elasticity in explaining the
geographic heterogeneity. In section 3, I build a two-period stylized model to understand the
effect of housing market risk on portfolio allocations. Section 4 provides empirical evidence on
5
how variation in housing market risk affects household portfolio choice. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Housing Market Heterogeneity and Heterogeneous Background
Risk
In this section, I examine whether the geographic heterogeneity in housing market risk
prevails and housing supply elasticity plays a role in explaining the regional variations. The
housing asset is risky in the sense that house price is volatile and correlated with prices of
other assets such as stock and human capital. Since housing demand and supply are largely
affected by region-specific factors such as local labor income, local population growth and
land constraints, house price dynamics and attendant housing market risk varies greatly
region to region. My examination of geographic heterogeneity in housing market risk takes
into account three risk measures related to housing assets: volatility of housing return,
correlation between housing return and stock return, and correlation between housing return
and labor income growth rate. Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level data show that
these three risk measures vary across region, and these regional variations can be explained
largely by local housing supply elasticity.
1.2.1 Regional Variation in Volatility of House Price Growth Rate
The volatility of the return on housing asset is an important factor that characterizes housing
asset as a risky investment. To examine how housing market risk varies across regions, I
first focus on the regional variation in standard deviations of house price growth rate. Using
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level House Price Index (HPI) by Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), I estimate standard deviations of house price growth rate for 228
MSAs from 1990 to 2010. Figure 1.1.A shows the distribution of the estimated standard
deviations. As the figure shows, there is a considerable variation in the standard deviations
across MSAs. To illustrate the regional variation in the standard deviation, these statistics
6
are put on the map of the United States in Figure 1.1.B. As can be seen in the figure,
households have experienced totally different house price dynamics depending on the location
of their residence.
The regional variation in house price dynamics can be explained largely by local hous-
ing supply elasticity (Saiz , 2010). Since housing supply elasticity is determined mainly by
land scarcity and zoning regulation, which seldom change over time but vary greatly across
regions, it has been widely used as a proxy for local house price dynamics in the literature
(Mian and Sufi , 2009, 2010, 2011; Mian et al., 2013; Chetty and Szeidl , 2010). House price
volatility is also closely related to housing supply elasticity. When there is an aggregate
demand shock, house prices change in response to this shock. However, the extent to which
house price responds to the aggregate demand shock varies with housing supply elasticity.
In areas where housing supply elasticity is low, house price is more sensitive to the aggregate
demand shock. That is, the effect of aggregate shocks on house prices is amplified in areas
where housing supply elasticity is low, rendering house price more volatile in such areas
(Glaeser et al., 2008).
Using the estimated standard deviation of house price growth rate and housing supply
elasticity by Saiz (2010), I examine the relationship between volatility of house price growth
rate and housing supply elasticity in the following regression.
σ̂h,i = τ0 + τ1HSEi + i (1.1)
where HSEi indicates housing supply elasticity in MSA i and σ̂h,i is the estimated standard
deviation of housing price growth rate. The estimated coefficient on housing supply elas-
ticity, τˆ1, is -0.010 with standard error 0.001. The negative coefficient on housing supply
elasticity implies that the volatility of house price growth rate decreases with housing supply
elasticity so that in areas where housing supply elasticity is low, households are more likely
to experience high volatility of house price growth rate. Figure 1.2 confirms the negative
relationship between the volatility of house price growth rate and housing supply elasticity.
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1.2.2 Correlation between Housing Return and Other Asset Returns
For stockholders, housing assets are risky not only because house price growth rate is volatile,
but also it is correlated with stock returns. Since stocks are traded in nationwide markets,
region-specific factors that affect local house prices usually do not influence stock prices,
especially market index such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500).1 On the contrary,
the stock return shocks can affect local housing demand, and the change in local housing
demand is reflected in local house price but in different magnitude depending on local housing
supply elasticity.2 Therefore, it stands to reason that the correlation between stock return
and local house price growth rate varies across regions.
Household portfolio choice is also affected by the correlation between house price growth
rate and labor income growth rate. The effect of labor income uncertainty on household
saving and portfolio decision is examined from various perspectives in the literature (Bodie
et al., 1992; Kimball , 1993; Guiso et al., 1996; Viceira, 2001; Gomes and Michaelides , 2003;
Benzoni et al., 2007; Polkovnichenko, 2007; Lynch and Tan, 2011). While the effects of labor
income risk and housing market risk on the portfolio choice are important on their own, how
these two background risks are correlated to each other also matters when we consider the
effect of these background risks on portfolio choice. Moreover, since the labor income varies
considerably across regions and it directly affects local housing demand, it is worthwhile to
examine the regional variation in the correlation between house price growth rate and labor
income growth rate.
The following simplified relationships between the quantity (Q) and price (P ) of housing
are used to examine how local house price growth rate is correlated with stock return and
1The stock price of a company whose operations are closely related to local economy can be affected by
region-specific shocks. If stock investors prefer to hold stocks of locally specialized company, their portfolios
are vulnerable to region-specific shocks (Coval and Moskowitz , 1999). However, in this paper, I assume that
households holds aggregate level stock index so that their portfolios are free of region-specific shocks.
2Poterba (2000) briefly summarizes evidence on the link between stock prices and real estate.
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local labor income growth rate.
∆ ln(Qs,i,t) = εs,i∆ ln(Pi,t) + ui,t (1.2)
∆ ln(Qd,i,t) = εd∆ ln(Pi,t) + ε
S
d∆ ln(St) + ε
Y
d ∆ ln(Yi,t) + vi,t (1.3)
where Qs and Qd are the quantities of housing supplied and demanded, S is stock price, Y
is labor income, εs and εd are the price elasticities of housing supply and demand, ε
S
d and
εYd are the elasticities of housing demand with respective to stock price and labor income,
and i indicates MSA. In the housing supply equation (1.2), I assume housing supply to
be explained by house price and an unobservable factor, ui,t, which affects local housing
supply, but is not correlated with local house price. Housing demand, on the other hand,
is determined by housing price as well as stock price and labor income, as shown in the
housing demand equation (1.3). The term vi,t is a factor that affects housing demand other
than house price, stock price, and labor income. Among various elasticities, only the price
elasticity of housing supply is assume to vary across regions as subscript i indicates in the
equations.
To represent house price growth rate as a function of stock return and labor income
growth rate, I use the equilibrium condition, ∆ ln(Qs,i,t) = ∆ ln(Qd,i,t), which draws the
following equation.
∆ ln(Pi,t) =
εSd
εs,i − εd∆ ln(St) +
εYd
εs,i − εd∆ ln(Yi,t) +
vi,t − ui,t
εs,i − εd (1.4)
where the term
vi,t−ui,t
εs,i−εd is independent of ∆ ln(Si,t) and ∆ ln(Yi,t) by construction. Equation
(1.4) reveals the relationship between local house price growth rate (∆ ln(Pi,t)) and stock
return (∆ ln(St)), and local labor income growth rate (∆ ln(Yi,t)). Notable in this equation is
that the coefficients on ∆ ln(St) and ∆ ln(Yi,t) vary across region i due to the housing supply
elasticity (εs,i) in each coefficient. More specifically, the coefficients are inversely related
to the housing supply elasticity in region i. To incorporate this relationship in the panel
9
regression model, I assume the following functional form of the coefficients on ∆ ln(St) and
∆ ln(Yt):
βSi = β
S
0 + β
S
1
1
εs,i
(1.5)
βYi = β
Y
0 + β
Y
1
1
εs,i
(1.6)
where βSi and β
Y
i are coefficients on ∆ ln(St) and ∆ ln(Yt), respectively. Based on these
assumptions, the equation (1.4) can be rewritten as follows.
∆ ln(Pi,t) = β
S
0 ∆ ln(St) + β
S
1
[
1
εs,i
×∆ ln(St)
]
+ βY0 ∆ ln(Yi,t) + β
Y
1
[
1
εs,i
×∆ ln(Yi,t)
]
+ zi,t (1.7)
where the error term zi,t is independent of ∆ ln(Si,t) and ∆ ln(Yi,t). To estimate the coeffi-
cients βS0 , β
S
1 , β
Y
0 , and β
Y
0 , house price growth rate (∆ ln(Pi,t)) is regressed on stock return,
stock return interacted with the inverse of housing supply elasticity, labor income growth
rate, and labor income growth rate interacted with the inverse of housing supply elasticity.
I use the MSA-level quarterly house price index by the FHFA as local house price (Pi),
S&P 500 Index as stock price (S), and MSA-level average wage data by the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW) as local labor income (Yi). I use the panel data of 228
MSA samples from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4 (228 × 84), to estimate the coefficients βS0 , βS1 , βY0 ,
and βY0 from equation (1.7). While the concurrent response of house price growth rate
with respect to stock return and labor income growth rate is important, the effect of lagged
variables should also be considered to reflect the sluggish response of house price to changes
in stock return and labor income growth rate in the previous periods. Table 1.2 reports
the estimated coefficients on current stock return and labor income growth rate as well as
those on the lagged variables. To estimate the aggregate effect of all coefficients, I report the
aggregated coefficient based on Dimson (1979) approach. In the baseline case without lagged
variables, all coefficients are positive, meaning that both stock return and labor income
growth rate positively affect local house price growth rate. The positive coefficients on
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interaction terms imply that the positive effect of stock return and labor income growth rate
on house price growth rate is strengthened as housing supply elasticity decreases. Although
including the lagged variables increases the magnitude of the aggregate coefficients, the
direction of the effect remains positive. Stock return and labor income growth rate thus
positively affect house price growth rate even in the presence the effect of lagged variables.
In this section, I find the volatility of house price growth rate and its correlation with
stock return and local labor income growth rate to vary across regions, and this regional
variation to be largely explained by housing supply elasticity. In areas with low housing
supply elasticity, house price growth rate is more volatile, and more positively correlated
with stock return and local labor income growth rate than in areas with high housing supply
elasticity.3 Therefore, households in areas with low housing supply elasticity are exposed to
higher housing market risk than those in areas with high housing supply elasticity.
1.3 Stylized Two-period Model
In this section, I build a stylized two-period model following Campbell and Viceira (2002)
and Chetty and Szeidl (2010). This model provides basic intuition on how the volatility of
house price and the extent to which house price correlates with other uncertainties affects
household portfolio choice.
Model Set-up. In this model, households are endowed with housing assets Ht and liquid
financial assets Wt at period t. Households allocate liquid financial assets into risky stocks
and risk-free bonds to maximize the utility at period t+ 1 as follows.
max
α,C,H
E0
[
(C1−θt+1H
θ
t+1)
1−γ
1− γ
]
(1.8)
3Glaeser et al. (2008) show that house price is more volatile in areas in which housing supply elasticity
is low. Harter-Dreiman (2004) studies how housing supply elasticity explains the relationship between local
house price and local labor income dynamics.
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s.t.
Xt+1 = Wt(1 +Rp,t+1) + Yt+1 + Pt+1Ht (1.9)
Xt+1 = Ct+1 + Pt+1Ht+1 (1.10)
Rp,t+1 = αRs,t+1 + (1− α)Rf (1.11)
where Yt+1 is labor income at t+1, which has the log-normal distribution, yt+1 = log(Yt+1) ∼
N(y, σ2y), and Pt+1 is the unit price of housing service, which has the log-normal distribution,
pt+1 = log(Pt+1) ∼ N(µp, σ2p).4 The gross rate of return on risk-free assets is 1+Rf = exp(rf )
and the gross rate of return on risky stock is 1+Rs = exp(rs), where rs,t+1 = log(1+Rs,t+1) ∼
N(µs,σ
2
s). Portfolio return Rp,t+1 is determined by the risk-free rate Rf , return on risky stock
Rs, and portfolio allocation α. In this model, short sales are not allowed (i.e. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1).
Additionally, I assume that households can move at no cost to make the solution of this
problem analytically tractable.5
Log-linear Approximate Solution. To find an approximate analytical solution for this
maximization problem, I use the log-linear approximate method following Campbell (1993)
and Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2001). I first take log of equation (1.9) after dividing both
sides of the equation by Yt+1, and then take a first-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand-
side around rp,t+1 = E [rp,t+1] ≡ rp, yt+1 = E [yt+1] ≡ y and pt+1 = E [pt+1] ≡ p. This
provides the following log-linearized budget constraint.
xt+1 − yt+1 = log [exp {wt + rp,t+1 − yt+1}+ exp {ht + pt+1 − yt+1}+ 1] (1.12)
xt+1 − yt+1 ≈ k + ρA(rp,t+1 − rp) + ρB(yt+1 − y) + ρC(pt+1 − p) (1.13)
xt+1 ≈ k′ + ρArp,t+1 + (ρB + 1)yt+1 + ρCpt+1 (1.14)
4House price at t being assumed to be 1, log house price at t+ 1, pt+1, can be interpreted as house price
growth rate.
5Chetty and Szeidl (2010) also assume no moving cost, but in their paper, households move only with
exogenous moving shock at the probability of θ. Probability 1− θ is interpreted as the commitment on the
current home.
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where k and k′ are constant, and ρi∈{A,B,C} are as follows.
ρA =
exp {wt + rp − y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.15)
ρB =
− exp {wt + rp − y} − exp {ht + p− y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.16)
ρC =
exp {ht + p− y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.17)
As this model assumes no moving cost, households allocate total wealth at t + 1 into non-
durable consumption goods and housing service according to housing preference θ.
Ct+1 = (1− θ)Xt+1
Pt+1Ht+1 = θXt+1
Then the utility function can be represented as a function of Xt+1
V (Xt+1) =
(
(1− θ)1−θθθ)1−γ
1− γ
(
Xt+1
P θt+1
)1−γ
(1.18)
The maximization problem (1.8) can be rewritten as follows.
max
α
E0 [V (Xt+1)]
s.t.
Xt+1 = Wt(1 +Rp,t+1) + Yt+1 + Pt+1Ht
Rp,t+1 = αRs,t+1 + (1− α)Rf
The solution for this maximization problem is derived in Appendix A. It is given by
α =
E [rt+1 − rf ] + 12σ2s
γρAσ2s
− γρC + θ(1− γ)
γρA
σps
σ2s
− (ρB + 1)
ρA
σys
σ2s
(1.19)
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where σps is the covariance between house price and stock return and σys is the covariance
between labor income and stock return.
Comparative statistics. Based on the analytical solution for optimal stock share de-
scribed above, I examine how household portfolio choice is affected by the volatility of house
price and its correlation with stock price and labor income. Similar to the approach in
Campbell and Viceira (2002), I first consider the effect of a mean-preserving increase in the
variance of house price on the optimal stock share.
Proposition 1. When ρA > 1/γ, a mean-preserving increase in the variance of log house
price (σ2p) reduces stock share.
∂αt
∂σ2p
∣∣∣∣
E[Pt+1]=P¯
< 0 when ρA > 1/γ
Proof. See the appendix.
To interpret this result, I rewrite ρA as follows.
ρA =
exp {wt + r − y}
1 + exp {wt + r − y}+ exp {ht + ph − y}
=
exp {wt + r}
exp {y}+ exp {wt + r}+ exp {ht + ph}
≈ W (1 +R)
Y +W (1 +R) + PHH
(1.20)
The right hand side of equation (1.20) represents the ratio of the expected value of liquid
financial asset to total wealth. If we assume the risk aversion parameter, γ, to be the same
across individuals, house price volatility is more likely to negatively affect stock shares of
those who put a relatively large portion of their total wealth into financial assets. If financial
assets represent a relatively small portion of total wealth, whether the effect of house price
volatility is negative depends on other conditions, such as the relative risk aversion coefficient
and current stock share.
Proposition 2. Portfolio share decreases in the covariance between house price and stock
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return (σps) if and only if ρC >
γ−1
γ
θ
Proof. It is straightforward from equation (1.19).
In this proposition, ρC can be interpreted as the share of housing asset in total wealth, as
shown in the following approximation.
ρC =
exp {ht + p− y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y}
≈ PH
Y +W (1 +RP ) + PH
The condition ρC >
γ−1
γ
θ implies that the correlation between house price and stock price
has a negative effect on portfolio choice when the share of housing assets in total wealth
is relatively larger than the housing preference θ. The housing preference determines the
amount of housing service that households consume in the second period. Households en-
dowed with a relatively small amount of housing assets in the first period need to purchase
more housing services in the second period, depending on their housing preferences. In this
case, households are born to take a short position in future house price. If stock price is
positively correlated with house price, stocks provide a hedge against the short position. The
correlation between house price and stock price thus positively affects stock share.
In the previous section, the correlation between house price and labor income is shown
to vary across regions. I consider the effect of the correlation between house price and labor
income in this model by assuming the following linear relationship between labor income
and house price.
Assumption 1. pt+1 = βyt+1 + ψt+1 where yt+1 and ψt+1 are independent.
In this assumption, β can be interpreted as the sensitivity of house price to labor income,
which, as shown in the previous section, varies across region.6 To examine how the variation
6From this linear relationship, the correlation between house price and labor income can be represented
as follows. ρpy = Corr(pt+1, yt+1) =
Cov(βyt+1+ψt+1,yt+1)
σpσy
= β
σy
σp
. Therefore, high β means high correlation
between house price and labor income ρpy (
∂ρpy
∂β > 0).
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in β affects portfolio allocation, I rewrite the optimal stock share (α) as follows based on
assumption 1.
α =
E [rt+1 − rf ] + 12σ2s
γρ′Aσ2s
− γρ
′
C + θ(1− γ)
γρ′A
σps
σ2s
− (ρ
′
B + 1)
ρ′A
σys
σ2s
(1.21)
where
ρ′A =
exp {wt + rp − y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.22)
ρ′B =
− exp {wt + rp − y}+ (β − 1) exp {ht + p− y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.23)
ρ′C =
−(1/β) exp {wt + rp − y}+ (1− 1/β) exp {ht + p− y}
1 + exp {wt + rp − y}+ exp {ht + p− y} (1.24)
The equation for optimal share now contains β terms. From this modified equation, we can
understand the effect of the correlation between labor income and house price on portfolio
choice.
Proposition 3. Portfolio share decreases with the sensitivity of house price to labor income
(β).
Proof.
∂α
∂β
= − 1
β2
(1 +
exp {ht + p}
exp {wt + rp})−
exp {ht + p}
exp {wt + rp} < 0
The proposition 3 implies that the stock share in financial assets decreases as the correlation
between house price and labor income increases. When house price is positively correlated
with labor income, background risk becomes higher and households need to reduce the risk
in financial wealth to maintain overall risk to their total wealth.
In sum, the correlation between house price and labor income always negatively affects
household portfolio choice, whereas the effects of the volatility of house price and the corre-
lation between house price and stock price vary with other conditions, especially the share
of housing asset in total wealth. This is mainly due to the special characteristic of housing
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asset as durable consumption goods. Households drive utility directly from housing assets.
Therefore, owning a house is not necessarily associated with higher risk exposure even in
the presence of volatility of house price as it protects households from uncertainty in future
housing consumption (Sinai and Souleles , 2005; Paciorek and Sinai , 2012). For households
that plan to upsize their homes, stock investments compensate for the funds required for
new home purchase when stock price is positively correlated with house price. The role of
housing market risk in household portfolio choice can thus vary significantly depending on
housing preference and current housing share in total wealth.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
This section provides empirical evidence on how households respond to region-specific hous-
ing market risk. I use two identification strategies to distinguish the sole effect of housing
risk from the combined effect of housing and labor income risk. First, housing supply elas-
ticity is used to identify the region-specific housing market risk. Second, I use retirement
status as an indicator of labor income risk to examine the combined effect of housing and
labor income risks on portfolio choice.
1.4.1 Data
The main data set used in this paper is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data with
geographical information. The HRS is a longitudinal panel data set that surveys more than
26,000 individuals over the age of 50 biennially since 1992. I use the restricted version of
the HRS data to obtain geographic information. Geographic information includes location
of main residence, birth place, and distance of relocation when households move. One char-
acteristic that distinguishes the HRS from other survey data is the abundance of the elderly
in the sample. For example, whereas the HRS survey targeted heads of household age 50
and older, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), another longitudinal survey, tracks
individuals in all age groups every year or every other year. My focus on elderly households
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reflects the greater importance of local housing market risk to that group. According to the
US Census, the moving rate decreases with age and stabilizes after late 40s. Additionally,
homeownership rates for elderly households are relatively high. Taking these two stylized
facts into consideration, local housing market risk exerts a greater influence on older home-
owners who have invested a large part of their wealth in housing assets and are less likely
to move. Another important benefit of the HRS data is that it includes a relatively large
number of retired households. Using retired households, that no longer have labor income
risk, as a control group, I am able to examine how the effect of housing market risk on
portfolio choice varies with the presence of labor income risk.
Sample Selection
For the main analysis, I use the HRS data from the 1998 through 2010 waves. In 1998, a
significant change in sample composition took place in the HRS. First, the “original” HRS
data was merged with the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest-Old (AHEAD)
data.7 Second, two new cohorts, namely the Children of the Depression (1924-1930) cohort
and the War Babies (1942-1947) cohort, were newly added. Because of these modifications,
the sample size of the HRS changed significantly in 1998. Since this paper often uses a
change in household wealth or income level by comparing samples between two consecutive
surveys, I focus on the survey periods over which sample size remain relatively stable.
Although the HRS has surveyed more than 26,000 individuals, not all of them are rel-
evant to this study. For example, the main focus of this paper being household portfolio
allocation in the liquid financial wealth, households with few liquid assets are irrelevant to
this study. Including irrelevant households in the sample impedes examination of the real ef-
fect of household portfolio allocation. To avoid bias induced by irrelevant sample households
and ensure comparability with results reported in the literature, I restrict the sample based
on the following criteria: 1) Married or single household with the head aged between 50 and
7The “original” HRS has collected data in 1992, 1994, and 1996, while the AHEAD has collected in 1993
and 1995.
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80;8,9 2) Households whose financial liquid asset is greater than $10,000; 3) Households that
own their main residence;10 4) Households whose main residence is located in the Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for which measures of housing supply elasticity by Saiz (2010)
are available. Table 1.1 in the Appendix shows the sample size after each selection criteria
is applied.
Geographical Distribution
To study geographic heterogeneity in housing market characteristics effectively, sample needs
to be widely distributed across regions. Although the HRS was not designed to represent all
areas of the United States, the sample is relatively well distributed, having been collected
from more than 300 MSAs. In the main analysis, I match the HRS data with housing supply
elasticity information by Saiz (2010). Since Saiz (2010) provides housing supply elasticity
information for 269 MSAs, after matching with this information, I end up with 269 MSA
samples. The number of MSAs is further reduced after applying for the sample selection
criteria described above. The coverage of MSA after applying each sample selection criteria
is summarized in Table 1.1 in the appendix. The final sample represents 189 MSAs.11
Variable Definitions
Household portfolio choice, the main focus of the present study, usually refers to the decision
regarding the portion of household liquid wealth to put into stocks, or risky investments. In
this paper, I define liquid financial wealth as the sum of cash, checking, saving or money
market accounts, stocks and mutual funds, and bonds, subtracted by other debts including
credit card debt and personal loans but excluding mortgage and home equity loan. Stock
share is calculated by dividing the total amount of stocks and mutual funds by liquid financial
8Although I include both married and single households, I exclude the household in which the marital
status of head has been changed. The reason I exclude this sample is that the marital status change by itself
causes a significant change in household portfolio, misleading the effect of other factors on portfolio choice.
9The HRS does not provide the definition of household head. I define household head as a member of
household whose earning is the highest among members throughout survey periods.
10Since this paper studies the effect of housing assets on portfolio choice, I only focus on the homeowners.
In the robustness test, I consider the risky investment behavior of households that rent their residence.
11Because the size of MSAs vary greatly, the sample size for each area also is different from each other.
However, there is no significant variation over survey years within the same MSA.
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wealth. Alternatively, I consider stock shares in total wealth, which counts liquid wealth as
well as the net value of business, IRA accounts, value of main residence and other real estate,
minus mortgage and home equity loan.
The relative portion of housing assets in total wealth is an important factor in examining
the effect of the housing asset on portfolio choice. Since home purchase is usually financed
by mortgage, both total value of house and home equity are taken into account in estimating
the relative portion of housing assets in total wealth. Housing share and home equity share
in total wealth are defined as follows.12
HousingShare =
Value of Housing Asset
Total Wealth+Remaining Mortgage Balance+Home Equity Loan
HomeEquityShare =
Value of Housing Asset− Remaining Mortgage Balance−Home Equity Loan
Total Wealth
Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 summarizes the financial status of the sample used in the study. As shown in
Section 2, housing market risk varies considerably with housing supply elasticity. To un-
derstand the effect of regional variation in housing market risk on household asset holdings
and composition, I report summary statistics for three groups with different housing supply
elasticity: low, medium, and high housing supply elasticity groups. Average housing supply
elasticity for low, medium, and high groups is 1.029, 1.836, and 3.191, respectively. Addi-
tionally, the effect of age on household asset holdings is illustrated by reporting summary
statistics for three age groups: age between 51 and 60, between 61 and 70, and between 71
and 80.
Considerable variations is observed in summary statistics across the housing supply elas-
ticity groups. On average, the low housing supply elasticity group is wealthier and earns
more income than the high housing supply elasticity group. Mean values of housing assets,
12In the HRS, the value of housing asset is estimated based on the question: “What is its present value?
I mean, what would it bring if it were sold today?”. Since this value is self-estimated housing value, it may
be different from the market value of the house. In analyzing the effect of housing asset on portfolio choice,
however, the self-estimated value of house is as good as any other measures.
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liquid assets, and stock assets for the low housing supply elasticity group are also higher
than those for the high housing supply elasticity group. Most notably, the mean value of
the housing asset is approximately 83 percent higher for the low housing supply elasticity
group (269,000 in 2000 dollars) than for the high housing supply elasticity group (147,000
in 2000 dollars). Households hold significant amount of stocks, on average, 71,000 in 2000
dollars for the whole sample and 126,000 in 2000 dollars among stock market participants.
Regional variation among groups is less significant for average stock holdings than for the
value of housing assets and total wealth.
Household asset holdings also vary with age. Interestingly, the average value of the
housing asset decreases with age, while average values of liquid assets and stock assets
increases with age. No significant difference in home equity level is observed across age
groups, however. This pattern of decreasing house value is observed across all housing
supply elasticity groups. Since households usually downsize their homes and pay off their
mortgages as the homeowners grow older, the average value of the housing asset decreases
with age, but the home equity remains unchanged.
To better understand household asset composition, Table 1.4 summarizes the share of
assets in total wealth or liquid financial wealth. Households, on average, put almost 40
percent of their total wealth into home equity. There is a significant difference in home
equity shares across regions: low housing supply elasticity group holds 43 percent of total
wealth in housing, while average home equity share of high housing supply elasticity group is
36.4 percent. The share of liquid asset holdings of low housing supply elasticity group (25.9
percent), on the other hand, is lower than the share of high housing supply elasticity group
(31.8 percent). No significant difference in stock shares in financial liquid assets is observed
between two groups.
In sum, the summary statistics show that household asset holdings and composition vary
across regions and age groups. Between households in areas with low and high housing
supply elasticity, we observe significant differences in total wealth and income level, but
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not in stock shares. Given that wealth and income levels generally affect household stock
investment, the absence of significant differences in stock shares between these two regions
is noteworthy and warrants further investigation. The following empirical analysis explores
how housing market risk might explain the findings inferred from the summary statistics.
1.4.2 Identification Strategy
To identify the regional variation in housing market risk, I use the housing supply elasticity as
a measure of local housing market risk. As shown in Section 2, in areas where housing supply
elasticity is low, households are exposed to higher housing market risk in the sense that 1)
housing return is more volatile, and 2) housing return is more positively correlated with
stock return and labor income growth rate. On the contrary, in areas where housing supply
elasticity is high, housing market risk is relatively low. Moreover, because the geographic
constraint is a main determinant of housing supply elasticity, it rarely changes over time.
Therefore, housing supply elasticity can be used as a measure of local housing market risk
that households in a specific region face.
Although conventional risk measures such as volatility of housing return can be used as
measure of local housing market risk, conventional risk measures based on historical data
can be easily tainted by temporary economic shock and may misrepresent true nature of
local housing market condition. On the other hand, local housing supply elasticity, which
is mainly determined by geographic characteristics, is the principal cause of fundamental
mechanism by which future housing market risk is determined, and therefore, better explains
the intrinsic housing market risk to which households in specific areas are exposed. For
example, households in areas where housing supply elasticity is low expect that future house
price can be volatile even if they have experienced stable housing market over last five.
Additionally, I distinguish the joint effect of housing and labor income risks from the
effect only of housing risk using retirement status as a proxy for labor income risk. Labor
income risk is unavoidable as long as individuals participate in labor market. However, after
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retirement, individuals no longer worry about an uncertainty in labor income. Retirement
income, generally in the form of social security and pensions, being stable and unaffected
by aggregate economic conditions, the risk associated with a positive correlation between
housing and labor income risk disappears after retirement.
Using housing supply elasticity and retirement status as independent variables, I estimate
the effect of housing market risk and labor income risk jointly in the following regression
equation.
αi,t = β0 + β1HSEi + β2Retiredi,t + β3(HSEi ×Retiredi,t) + γXi,t + i,t (1.25)
where αi,t is the stock share of individual i at time t, HSEi is the housing supply elasticity of
the region where individual i resides, Retiredi,t is the retirement status of individual i, and X
is a set of demographic characteristics that include race, education, religion, and the number
of children. I use this regression equation to test whether household stock shares vary with
housing market risk and working status, conditional on stock market participation. In the
regression, β1 can be interpreted as the combined effect of the volatility of housing return,
the correlation between housing and stock returns, and the correlation between house return
and labor income growth rate. On the other hand, β1 + β3 measures the effect of housing
risk after eliminating labor income risk.
1.4.3 Results
1.4.3.1 Baseline regression
Table 1.5 presents the result of the baseline regression.The first column reports the result of
baseline regression without interaction terms for the full sample. The coefficient on housing
supply elasticity is positive and statistically significant, meaning that the average stock share
of households in areas with high housing supply elasticity is higher than the share in areas
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with low housing supply elasticity. This result holds after controlling for other variables
such as income, wealth level, and demographic characteristics. As reported in the summary
statistics, average housing supply elasticities in low and high groups are 1.029 and 3.191,
respectively. Since the difference in housing supply elasticity between two groups is 2.162,
the coefficient on housing supply elasticity, 0.008, implies a corresponding difference in stock
share of 1.7 percent, on average. I also run the same regression for working household samples
and retired household samples separately. Column (2) and (3) are results for working group
and retired group, respectively. The coefficients on housing supply elasticity are positive for
both cases, but higher for the working group, at 0.015, than that for retired group, at 0.002,
and statistically significant only for the former. In column (4), I interact the housing supply
elasticity with retirement status to check how the marginal effect of housing market risk
on risky share changes after retirement. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative
and statistically significant, showing that the positive effect of housing supply elasticity on
portfolio choice becomes weaker after retirement. This result is consistent with results with
separate samples. That is, households respond to housing market risk less sensitively after
retirement.
This baseline regression model shows that households reduce stock share in presence
of high housing market risk, but the effect of housing market risk on portfolio choice is
weakened after retirement. To interpret this result, I focus on the role of labor income
risk. As the literature points out, labor income flows serve as “bond like” riskless assets
and crowd riskless assets out of portfolio, especially when labor income is less correlated to
stock return. In areas with low housing supply elasticity, however, labor income correlates
strongly with housing return, which amplifies background risks. This effect weakens the
role of labor income as a substitute for safe assets. Because labor income is correlated with
neither stock return nor housing return in areas with high housing supply elasticity, its role
as a hedge against stock market risk is unimpaired in such areas. Households in areas with
high housing supply elasticity, when they no longer have labor income, reduce stock shares
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as the crowding out effect of labor income disappears.
1.4.3.2 Controlling for the Effect of Home Equity Share
Households in areas with low housing supply elasticity are exposed to higher housing market
risk. On the other hand, the average house price level and growth rate are also high in areas
with low housing supply elasticity (Saiz , 2010). In the long run, homeowners in these areas
have experienced higher appreciation in the value of their homes, while housing expenses
such as mortgage debt payment and implicit cost of housing have also been high. Because
of high growth rates and high commitments, housing assets account for a greater portion in
household finance in low housing supply elasticity areas. The relative importance of housing
assets in total wealth can affect household stock investment decision, which is distinguished
from the effect of house price volatility and its correlation with other asset prices. To control
for the effect of high commitment, I include the home equity share in total wealth as a
control variable in the baseline regression.13 Table 1.6 presents results of the regression with
home equity share as a control variable. As can be seen in the table, the home equity share
in total wealth negatively affects stock share in liquid financial wealth. Households that
allocate relatively more wealth to their houses tend to decrease stock shares. This effect is
significant for all specifications. Even after controlling for the effect of home equity share
on portfolio choice, however, the coefficient on housing supply elasticity remains significant.
This result confirms that household responds to the magnitude of risk in the housing asset
as well as the relative share of housing asset in their total wealth.
13Here, home equity share is the portion of home equity (house value - remanning mortgage balance - home
equity loan) in total wealth, while stock share is the portion stock assets in total liquid assets. Although
stock share is not directly related to home equity share in this set up, there could be a concern about a
systemic relationship between home equity share and stock share. Considering this issue, I instead use home
equity to income ratio as a measure of the relative importance of the housing asset in household finance.
Even using this alternative measure as control variable, the effect of housing supply elasticity on stock share
remains significant.
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1.4.3.3 Regression by Home Equity Share
The two-period stylized model in Section 3 shows that the home equity share has a significant
effect on how housing market risk affects portfolio allocation. Depending on the portion of
home equity in total wealth, the volatility of house price growth rate and its correlation with
stock return can affect stock share either negatively or positively. In this section, I examine
how the effect of housing market risk on portfolio choice varies with home equity share. I
first rank all households by home equity shares, and divide the sample into quartile groups
according to home equity shares.14 To examine how the effect of housing supply elasticity
(i.e., housing market risk) on stock share varies with home equity share, I interact these
quartile groups with housing supply elasticity as in the following regression model.
αi,t = β0 + β1HSEi + β2(HSEi ×HomeEquityShareGroupi,t) + γXi,t + i,t
where HomeEquityShareGroup is an indicator for the home equity share quartile groups
and other variables are the same as in the baseline regression.
Table 1.7 reports the result of this regression by working status. Column (1), (2), and
(3) report results for entire sample, working group, and retirees, respectively. For the entire
sample, the coefficient on housing supply elasticity remains statistically significant only when
it is interacted with the lowest home equity share quartile group; the magnitude of the
coefficient increases to 0.012 for this group, compared to 0.008 in the baseline case in which
the effect of home equity share is not considered. For the working group sample, housing
supply elasticity has the strongest effect on portfolio choice in the lowest home equity share
group. Additionally, for the lowest home equity share group, the coefficient on housing
supply elasticity remains statistically significant even after retirement, while the coefficient
14For this grouping, I consider the households with home equity share between 0 and 1. Since home equity
is the value of house subtracted by mortgage amount, the home equity share cannot exceed 1 unless total
non-housing wealth is negative. Similarly, the home equity share cannot be less than 0 unless home equity
is negative. After grouping, each home equity share quartile group has home equity share 0 to 0.25, 0.25 to
0.5, 0.5 to 0.75, and 0.75 to 1, respectively.
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of housing supply elasticity is not statistically significant for retirees in the baseline regression.
Overall, for households whose home equity share is low, housing market risk exerts more
influence on portfolio choice. In the baseline regression, the effects of the volatility of house
price growth rate and its correlation with stock return are not significant because the result
shows the average effect over home equity share. However, when the effect of home equity
share is taken into account, we observe a significant effect of those two risk factors on portfolio
choice for households with low home equity share.
Proposition 1 in Section 3 states that the volatility of house price is more likely to affect
stock shares negatively when the portion of financial assets in total wealth is relatively large.
Since low home equity share means high financial shares by construction, Proposition 1
is consistent with the finding that the effect of housing market risk is more significant for
households with low home equity share. On the other hand, Proposition 2 in Section 3 states
that when current home equity share is relatively lower than future housing preference,
the positive correlation between house price and stock return can positively affect stock
share. This is because households need more housing assets in the future and, due to the
positive correlation, stocks provide a hedge against the short position in housing assets.
The regression result by home equity share group appears inconsistent with Proposition 2.
However, considering the fact that most of households in this study is likely to downsize
their homes as the head of household gets older, the positive correlation between house price
growth rate and stock return affect stock shares negatively even though the current home
equity share is small. Most homeowners in this study possess the excess amount of home
equity in the sense that they are more likely to downsize home in the future. Since this excess
amount that they sell in the future acts as risky investment, the positive correlation between
house price growth rate and stock return has a negative effect on stock share regardless of
home equity share. Therefore, the difference in the effect of housing market risk on portfolio
choice among home equity share groups is driven mainly by the effect of volatility of house
price growth rate.
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1.4.3.4 Effect of Mortgage
Housing investment has a leverage effect since most households finance home purchases with
mortgages. Leveraged positions in housing assets amplify housing market risk because the
effects of house price volatility and its correlation with other asset prices are multiplied by
the leverage ratio (i.e. 1/(1 − LTV ratio)). For example, for a household that purchases a
house with a 25 percent down payment and 75 percent mortgage, a five percent increase in
house value provides a 20 percent return on the net investment in the housing asset. Flavin
and Yamashita (2002) show, based on simulation results using a mean-variance efficiency
framework, that a mortgage has a significant effect on household portfolio choice.
In this paper, however, the effect of mortgage is not crucial since a large portion of
households in the HRS data has already paid off their mortgages and the loan-to-value(LTV)
ratio is relatively low for households that still hold mortgages. In the sample used for the
main analysis, the portion of mortgage holder is 36.1 percent and an average LTV ratio of
mortgage holders is 35.3 percent. While the portion of mortgage holders and average LTV
ratio are relatively low compared to young households,15 the effect of mortgage is still not
negligible. On that account, I examine the influence of leverage on the effect of housing
market risk on portfolio choice.
Table 1.8 presents the result of baseline regression by mortgage status. Comparing the
coefficient on housing supply elasticity in Column (1) and Column (4), we can find, for the
full sample, that mortgage holders are twice as sensitive as non-mortgage holders to housing
market risk. For the working sample, mortgage holders are 50 percent more sensitive to
housing market risk than non-mortgage holder, while for the retiree group, the housing
supply elasticity does not significantly affect portfolio allocation for mortgage holders as well
as non-mortgage holders.
I further analyze the leverage effect by testing whether the effect of housing market risk
15Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimate the household mortgage holdings using the PSID data. Average
LTV ratio of households whose head is age of between 18 and 30 is around 80 percent.
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on portfolio choice varies with the LTV ratio. To this end, I interact the LTV with housing
supply elasticity and regress stock share on this interaction term. Table 1.9.A shows that
the interaction term has positive and statistically significant coefficient, which implies that
the effect of housing market risk increases with the LTV ratio. To interpret the effect of this
interaction term more precisely, I estimate the marginal effect of housing supply elasticity
at different LTV ratios as shown in Table 1.9.B. The marginal effect of housing supply
elasticity increases from 0.02 to 0.048 as the LTV ratio increases from 0.4 to 0.8. This result
supports the idea that households respond to the leverage effect of mortgage borrowing. In
sum, although the effect of housing market risk exists for both mortgage holders and non-
mortgage holders, because the leveraged position in housing investment amplifies the effect
of housing market risk, greater sensitivity is exhibited by households that hold mortgages.
1.4.4 Relocation and Portfolio Adjustment
The result of the baseline regression is statistically significant and robust in various specifica-
tions. However, there could be potential selection bias issues since the location of residence
is closely related to other factors such as job and demographic distribution and income and
wealth level, all of which can affect portfolio allocation. If this is the case, portfolio choice
could be driven mainly by other characteristics of households in a specific region. To consider
the effect of other demographic and financial characteristics on portfolio choice, I include
various control variables in the baseline analysis. In addition, I deal with these potential
selection bias issues more carefully by focusing on individual level variation in housing mar-
ket risk. Housing market risk exposure may change significantly when individuals move to
other states or MSAs, and this change affects their portfolio choice. For example, household
that moves from Houston, where housing price is relatively stable, to a more volatile area
like San Francisco, might adjust its portfolio choice in response to the change in housing
market risk. Using samples of households for which the location of main residence changes
between two survey years, I examine how households change their portfolio choice when
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their housing market risk exposure changes. By focusing on the effect of individual level
variation in housing market risk, I control for the effect of individual-specific characteristics
on portfolio choice. Of course, portfolio choice can be affected by other changes in individual
status following relocation, such as increased housing share, changes in income and wealth
level, and job status change. Therefore, I test the effect of changes in housing market risk
on portfolio choice after controlling for these effects using the following regression equation.
∆αi,t = β0 + β1∆HSEi,t + β2OtherEventsi,t + i,t
where ∆αi,t is a change in stock share of household i between t−1 and t, ∆HSEi,t is a change
in housing supply elasticity of household i after moving, and OtherEventsi,t indicates change
in home equity share, total wealth, total income, and retirement status. I run this regression
for households that move to another MSA (between two survey years) that results in a
significant change in their exposure to housing market risk. Table 1.10 presents the result
of this regression. Each column reflects different control variables. For all specifications, the
coefficients on change in housing supply elasticity are positive and statistically significant,
which means that households increase stock shares when they move from a low to a high
supply elasticity area. These results are unaltered and remain statistically significant even
after controlling for change in home equity share, wealth, and income level. Since households
are more likely to move to other areas at retirement, I also consider the effect of retirement
on change in portfolio choice. The effect of retirement event on portfolio choice is, however,
not statistically significant. All things considered, change in housing supply elasticity is the
dominant factor that affects stock share change. Households respond actively to a change
in housing market risk, and adjust stock shares depending on the degree of housing market
risk exposure.
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1.4.5 Robustness Check
1.4.5.1 Alternative Definition of Risky Share
I consider stock and housing as two most important risky investments for average households.
However, households can invest in other types of risky assets like other real estate and
business. The portion of investment in other real estate including recreation home and
rental property is non-negligible. For the sample used in the main analysis, 22.3 percent
of households possess other real estate, and for these households, average shares of other
real estate in total wealth is 19.8 percent. Since households that bear additional risk from
other real estate investment may reduce stockholdings, stock share in financial assets does not
correctly measure the risk exposure of households that hold other real estate. To consider the
additional risk exposure brought by other real estate investment, I define the risky share as
the portion of stocks and other real estates in total non-housing wealth and examine whether
this alternatively defined risky share also responds to housing market risk. Table 1.11,
which reports the results of the regression using this alternative definition of risky share as
a dependent variable, shows the coefficient on housing supply elasticity to be positive and
statistically significant for the full sample and working group sample. While the magnitude
of coefficients is slightly lower than in the baseline regression, in which stock share in financial
wealth is used as a dependent variable, the overall effect of housing supply elasticity on risky
investment behavior remains the same. This result confirms that households respond to
housing market risk by adjusting the portion of other real estate as well as the portion of
stock asset.
1.4.5.2 Alternative Sample Selection
Renters
Renters, although they do not hold housing assets, are exposed to housing market risk in
the sense that they take short position in future housing services. Since rent price is inter-
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connected with house price, the volatility of house price renders renters’ future consumption
uncertain. However, the positive correlations between house price growth rate and stock
return, and between house price growth rate and labor income growth rate provide a hedge
against future rent expense. During housing market boom, for example, renters are expected
to spend more on rent payment, but the increased rental expenditure is partially offset by
increased labor income or stock return due to the positive correlations. Since the volatility
of house price growth rate and its correlation with stock return and labor income growth
rate exert effects in different directions, the effect of regional variation in housing market
risk on portfolio choice is tentative. To examine renters’ portfolio choice in the presence
of heterogeneous housing market risk, I run the baseline regression using samples that rent
their main residence. Results are presented in the first three columns in Table 1.12. As
can be seen, the coefficient on housing supply elasticity is not statistically different from
zero, regardless of working status. That is, renting households do not respond sensitively to
regional variation in housing market risk.16
Self-employed Household
As Heaton and Lucas (2000) point out, proprietary business wealth plays an important role
in household portfolio choice. Income from proprietary business is riskier than wage income
since proprietary business income is more highly correlated with stock returns. Additionally,
investment in proprietary business crowds out the opportunity for investment in common
stock. Proprietary business wealth thus substitutes for common stock holdings such that
households that own their own business tend to hold less stock. To consider the substitution
effect of proprietary business investment, I focus on self-employed households that drive
income primarily from their own business. Column (4) to (6) in Table 1.12 show how housing
market risk affects stock shares of self-employed households. As can be seen in the table,
16The majority of the HRS sample with financial wealth greater than 10,000 dollars own homes. The
smaller sample size could be one possible reason for statistical insignificancy. In the further studies to be
conducted with the younger sample, in which the proportions of homeowners and renters are not significantly
different, I plan to compare the risky investment behavior of homeowners and renters in the presence of
heterogeneous housing market risk.
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there is no significant relationship between local housing market risk and stock share of self-
employed households. When proprietary businesses are also considered as risky investments,
however, the risky investment behavior of self-employed households also respond to local
housing market risk as shown in Column (7) to (9) in Table 1.12. In other words, households
in areas where housing market risk is high tend to increase the portion of safe assets in their
non-housing wealth that includes proprietary business wealth as well as financial wealth.
1.4.5.3 Spouse Retirement Status
The main result of this paper indicates that retirement status of household head has a sig-
nificant effect on how regional variation in housing market risk affects household portfolio
choice. The presence of labor income risk explains this result. However, for married house-
holds in which both household head and spouse earn labor income, the labor income of
spouse may constitute a non-trivial portion of household total labor income.17 In this case,
the retirement status of spouse can also affect household portfolio choice. To take the effect
of spouse retirement into consideration, I define household retirement as a status in which
both head and spouse are retired.18 I test the baseline regression model substituting house-
hold retirement for head retirement. Table 1.13 reports the result. As the table shows, even
using household retirement instead of head retirement, the effect of housing supply elasticity
on portfolio choice is almost the same as in the baseline regression.
1.5 Conclusion
Housing market risk is difficult to avoid and not readily diversifiable because the house
plays a dual role as an investment and a place of residence. Household exposure to housing
17Since this paper defines head of household as the member whose labor income is higher than any other
member throughout the survey period, labor income of head is always higher than that of spouse. Working
status of household head is thus more important to household portfolio choice. For some households, however,
the difference in labor income between household head and spouse is insignificant, in which case spouse’s
labor income may represent a considerable proportion of total household income.
18For single households and married households in which the spouse has no labor income, head retirement
status is the same as household retirement status.
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market risk varies with the location of the main residence. In the presence of heterogeneous
housing market risk, households can strategically adjust their portfolio allocations so as to
maintain an optimal level of overall risk to their total wealth. This paper examines how
heterogeneity in housing market risk affects household portfolio choice by focusing on three
aspects of housing market risk: 1) volatility of house price growth rate, 2) the correlation
between house price growth rate and stock return, and 3) the correlation between housing
price growth rate and labor income growth rate. These three aspects of housing market risk
vary greatly across regions and this regional variation is explained largely by local housing
supply elasticity. Empirical evidence shows that households respond to these variations
in housing market risk and adjust their portfolio allocation accordingly. In areas with low
housing supply elasticity, housing market risk is higher and households tend to hold less stock
in their financial wealth. This tendency becomes weaker after retirement, emphasizing the
importance of the correlation between housing and labor income risks. Portfolio rebalancing
behavior in response to changes in housing market risk also confirms that households consider
the housing market risk differently depending on the location of their main residence.
Although the main findings in this paper are robust from various perspectives, some
limitations warrant further development. First, this paper does not distinguish the effect of
the volatility of house price growth rate on portfolio choice from the effect of the correlation
of house price growth rate and stock return, while the effect of the correlation between
housing and labor income risks is identified using retirement status as an indicator of labor
income risk. Since both the volatility of house price growth rate and its correlation with
stock return decrease with housing supply elasticity, it is difficult to identify these two risk
measures when we focus on the regional variation and use housing supply elasticity as an
indicator of the regional variation. Further studies could use the estimated volatility and
correlation coefficient to examine the effect of each factor on portfolio choice.
Secondly, this paper does not consider the effect of idiosyncratic labor income risk. This
paper uses the correlation between local house price growth rate and local labor income
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growth rate as a measure of combined risk of housing and labor income. However, the
correlation between these two risks can vary significantly across individuals as well as regions.
For example, people who work in the public sector, labor income is less correlated with
aggregate economic conditions and house price dynamics, even if they live in areas where
housing supply elasticity is low. In this case, the combined effect of housing and labor income
risk does not significantly affect household portfolio choice. Using individual level income
data in the HRS, the effect of idiosyncratic labor income risk and its relationship with local
housing market risk can be further examined.
Notwithstanding some limitations, this paper introduces a new perspective that enhances
our understanding of heterogeneity in household portfolio choice. Although households have
relatively easy access to global financial market owing to globalization and advancement in
technology, local economic conditions are still the most important consideration in household
financial decisions. Without considering the impact of local economy on household financial
decision, our understanding of household investment behavior would be much limited. This
paper offers a clue to the importance of local economic conditions in household finance.
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Figure 1.1: Standard Deviation of Annual House Price Growth Rate of MSAs from 1990 to
2010
A. Distribution of Standard Deviation of Annual House Price Growth Rate
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B. Map of the United States with Standard Deviation of Annual House Price Growth
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Notes: This figure is based on the standard deviation of average annual growth rate of the House Price Index
(HPI) for MSAs from 1990 to 2010. The HPI is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
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Figure 1.2: Standard Deviation of Annual House Price Growth Rate and Housing Supply
Elasticity
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
Es
tim
at
ed
 σ
h
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Housing Supply Elasticity
Notes: This figure is based on the standard deviation of average annual growth rate of the House Price Index
(HPI) for 228 MSAs from 1990 to 2010 and housing supply elasticity by Saiz (2010). The HPI is provided
by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
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Figure 1.3: Estimated Stock Shares by Housing Supply Elasticity
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated stock shares by housing supply elasticity for working and retired
groups. Error bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.4: Marginal Effect of Housing Supply Elasticity on Portfolio Choice by LTV Ratio
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Notes: The figure present the marginal effect of housing supply elasticity on portfolio choice by loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio. Error bars indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Table 1.1: Sample Size and Geographical Distributions
Selection Criteria Sample Size Number of MSA covered
Single or Married without change marital status 45,478 241
Household head age between 50 and 80 35,845 232
Financial liquid wealth more than 10,000 dollars 17,223 204
Homeowners 14,857 186
Stockowners 8,317 161
Table 1.2: Regression of house price growth rate on stock return and labor income growth rate
The table shows the coefficients of regression of house price growth rate (∆ lnP ) on current and lagged
series of stock return (∆ lnS) and labor income growth rate (∆ lnY ). The coefficients on stock return and
labor income growth rate interacted with inverse of housing supply elasticity are also reported (βS1 and β
Y
1 ,
respectively). Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Lag
k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 Aggregated Coefficients
βˆS0 (k) 0.013 0.013
(0.006)
0.010 0.005 0.016
(0.005) (0.005)
0.014 -0.016 0.040 0.038
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
βˆS1 (k) 0.049 0.049
(0.011)
0.010 0.044 0.054
(0.011) (0.010)
0.009 0.019 0.048 0.075
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
βˆY0 (k) 0.010 0.010
(0.004)
0.016 0.016 0.032
(0.004) (0.004)
0.014 0.019 0.015 0.048
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
βˆY1 (k) 0.023 0.023
(0.007)
0.034 0.048 0.082
(0.007) (0.009)
0.039 0.058 0.040 0.137
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
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Table 1.5: Regression of Stock Share on Housing Supply Elasticity (Baseline)
Dependent. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock Share All Working Retired Interaction
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.005 0.017***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head Retired 0.029*
(0.016)
Head Retired × HSE -0.013*
(0.007)
Head Age -0.008 0.017 -0.006 -0.002
(0.009) (0.014) (0.022) (0.009)
Head Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.009 -0.012* -0.003 -0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Head Health Status -0.021* -0.017 -0.025* -0.023*
(0.012) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012)
Ln(Household Income) -0.029*** -0.016** -0.041*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.059***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Demographic Char. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,026 2,909 3,117 6,026
R-squared 0.037 0.034 0.046 0.040
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Housing supply elasticity
is measured by matching the location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010). Head
retired is a binary indicator for retirement status of household head. Retirement status is based on self-
reported working status. Household size is the number of members in household. Head health status is
a binary indicator that has value ”0” when head is relatively healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic
characteristics controlled include race, education, and religion of the head and the number of children in
household. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level
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Table 1.6: Regression of Stock Share on Housing Supply Elasticity (HES Controlled)
Dependent. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock Share All Working Retired Interaction
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.006* 0.012** 0.003 0.014***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head Retired 0.028*
(0.016)
Head Retired × HSE -0.013*
(0.007)
Home Equity Share -0.069*** -0.084** -0.049 -0.069***
(0.023) (0.033) (0.035) (0.024)
Head Age -0.008 0.017 -0.005 -0.001
(0.009) (0.014) (0.022) (0.009)
Head Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Head Health Status -0.022* -0.020 -0.025* -0.024*
(0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012)
Ln(Household Income) -0.029*** -0.017** -0.042*** -0.029***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.060*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Demographic Char. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,998 2,893 3,105 5,998
R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.046 0.041
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Home equity share is the
share of home equity in total wealth. Housing supply elasticity is measured by matching the location of main
residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010). Head retired is a binary indicator for retirement status
of household head. Retirement status is based on self-reported working status. Household size is the number
of members in household. Head health status is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when head is relatively
healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education, and religion of
the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level
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Table 1.7: Regression of Stock Share on Housing Supply Elasticity by Home Equity Share Group
Dep. Var. Stock Share (1) (2) (3)
All Working Retired
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) -0.013 -0.011 -0.016
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017)
HSE × Home Equity Share High (0.5 to 0.75) 0.008 0.014 0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
HSE × Home Equity Share Low (0.25 to 0.5) 0.002 0.011* -0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
HSE × Home Equity Share Lowest (0 to 0.25) 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Head Age -0.008 0.017 -0.005
(0.009) (0.014) (0.022)
Head Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.008 -0.012 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Head Health Status -0.021* -0.017 -0.023
(0.012) (0.023) (0.015)
Ln(Household Income) -0.029*** -0.016** -0.041***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.059***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Demographic Char. Controlled Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,018 2,905 3,113
R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.048
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Home equity share is the
share of home equity in total wealth. Housing supply elasticity is measured by matching the location of main
residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010). Head retired is a binary indicator for retirement status
of household head. Retirement status is based on self-reported working status. Household size is the number
of members in household. Head health status is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when head is relatively
healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education, and religion of
the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level
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Table 1.8: Regression of Stock Share on HSE by Mortgage Status
Without Mortgage With Mortgage
All Working Retiree All Working Retiree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.008* 0.014* 0.006 0.016** 0.021*** 0.009
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Head Age -0.024* 0.014 -0.034 0.004 0.001 0.076*
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.044)
Head Age2 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.011 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008 -0.013 0.012
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
Head Health Status -0.021 -0.008 -0.025 -0.021 -0.032 -0.01
(0.013) (0.031) (0.016) (0.023) (0.037) (0.034)
Ln(Household Income) -0.038*** -0.018 -0.054*** -0.022*** -0.025** -0.024*
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.081*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Chars. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.048 0.051 0.052 0.027 0.021 0.051
No. of Obs. 3,881 1,442 2,439 2,145 1,467 678
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Mortgage status is based
on the self-reported remaining mortgage balance. Housing supply elasticity is measured by matching the
location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010). Head retired is a binary indicator for
retirement status of household head. Retirement status is based on self-reported working status. Household
size is the number of members in household. Head health status is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when
head is relatively healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education,
and religion of the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level
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Table 1.9: Effect of LTV on the Relationship between HSE and Stock Share (with or without
mortgage)
A. Regression with LTV Interaction term.
All Working Retiree All Working Retiree
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.005
0.004 0.005 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV) 0.050** 0.064** 0.033 -0.017 -0.003 0.029
0.020 0.025 0.037 (0.036) (0.048) (0.068)
HSE × LTV 0.040** 0.037* 0.003
(0.017) (0.022) (0.035)
Head Age -0.006 0.017 -0.004 -0.006 0.017 -0.004
(0.009) (0.014) (0.022) (0.009) (0.014) (0.022)
Head Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Household Income) -0.032*** -0.020** -0.043*** -0.032*** -0.020** -0.043***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.068***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demogrpahic Chars. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.038 0.036 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.046
No. of Obs. 6,004 2,895 3,109 6,004 2,895 3,109
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. LTV is estimated
by dividing remaining mortgage balance by the self-reported value of main residence. Housing supply
elasticity is measured by matching the location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010).
Head retired is a binary indicator for retirement status of household head. Retirement status is based on
self-reported working status. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education, health status,
and religion of the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level
B. Marginal effect of Housing Supply Elasticity on Stock Share by LTV ratio
At LTV
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
HSE 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.041 0.045
Std. Err. (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
t stat 1.37 2.68 3.44 3.54 3.41 3.26 3.13 3.02 2.94 2.87 2.82
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Table 1.10: Regression of Change in Stock Share on Change in Housing Supply Elasticity
Dep. Var. ∆Stock Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.033* 0.033* 0.032* 0.034** 0.038** 0.102***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.034)
∆HSE × Head Retired -0.088**
(0.040)
∆Home Equity Share -0.035 -0.027 -0.034 -0.028
(0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.077)
∆Total Wealth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆Household Income 0.007 0.003
(0.011) (0.012)
Head Retiring 0.042
(0.063)
Head Retired 0.049
(0.051)
Head Age 0.053** 0.053** 0.052** 0.051** 0.047* 0.039
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Head Age2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Household Income) 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.031)
Ln(Total Wealth) -0.040* -0.038 -0.032 -0.034 -0.030 -0.026
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Demographic Char. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283 283 283 283 243 256
R-squared 0.094 0.095 0.098 0.096 0.148 0.077
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a change in stock share in total financial assets. Home equity
share is the share of home equity in total wealth. Housing supply elasticity is measured by matching the
location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010). Head retired is a binary indicator for
retirement status of household head. Retirement status is based on self-reported working status. Household
size is the number of members in household. Head health status is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when
head is relatively healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education,
and religion of the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the
MSA level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level
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Table 1.11: Robustness Check I (Stock and Other Real Estate Share)
Dep. Var. All Working Retiree
Share of Stock and Other Real Estate (1) (2) (3)
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.006*** 0.015*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Head Age -0.029*** -0.005 -0.034*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.018)
Head Age2 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Head Health Status 0.002 -0.005 0.003
(0.010) (0.018) (0.012)
Ln(Household Income) -0.013*** -0.013* 0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.047***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Demogrpahic Chars. Controlled Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.035 0.025 0.040
No. of Obs. 6,025 2,908 3,117
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Housing supply
elasticity is measured by matching the location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010).
Head retired is a binary indicator for retirement status of household head. Retirement status is based on
self-reported working status. Household size is the number of members in household. Head health status
is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when head is relatively healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic
characteristics controlled include race, education, and religion of the head and the number of children in
household. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level
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Table 1.13: Robustness Check III (Household Retirement Status)
All Working Retiree Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Housing Supply Elasticity (HSE) 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.017***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Retired 0.031*
(0.016)
HSE × Household Retired -0.014**
(0.007)
Head Age -0.008 0.009 -0.017 -0.001
(0.009) (0.013) (0.023) (0.009)
Head Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Size -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Head Health Status -0.021* -0.020 -0.024 -0.023*
(0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.012)
Ln(Household Income) -0.029*** -0.016** -0.045*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Ln(Total Wealth) 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.068*** 0.060***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Chars. Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.037 0.036 0.045 0.040
No. of Obs. 6,026 3,315 2,711 6,026
Notes: Dependent variable for this analysis is a stock share in total financial assets. Housing supply
elasticity is measured by matching the location of main residence and the estimates provided by Saiz (2010).
Household retired is a binary indicator that has value ”1” when both head and spouse are retired and ”0”
otherwise. Retirement status is based on self-reported working status. Household size is the number of
members in household. Head health status is a binary indicator that has value ”0” when head is relatively
healthy and ”1” otherwise. Demographic characteristics controlled include race, education, health status,
and religion of the head and the number of children in household. All standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level
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CHAPTER II
Retirement and Portfolio Choice
2.1 Introduction
Baby Boomers are beginning to constitute a large portion of the aging population, and
as a result of their increased life expectancy, the financial sustainability of the U.S. social
security system is being significantly challenged. Given this challenge, understanding portfo-
lio choices of retirees, especially during the transition into retirement, has drawn increasing
attention. The portfolio choices of retirees are of interest because they not only affect asset
composition and returns, but also other economic decisions such as consumption and pension
benefits. Understanding portfolio choice is therefore of great importance in formulating and
implementing policies associated with retirement benefits. Conventional wisdom suggests
that when retirees anticipate that there will be a substantial decrease in income after re-
tirement, they will reduce their risk portfolio holdings when transitioning into retirement,
shifting portfolio composition from risky assets to relatively safe ones. However, this argu-
ment is not fully supported by either empirical or theoretical evidence in economic studies.
Whether and how this occurs remains a matter of debate. Though there are extensive theo-
retical studies about portfolio choice over the life cycle, the effect of retirement on portfolio
choice, or retirement effects, remains ambiguous.1 From an empirical perspective, the retire-
1The seminal works of Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971) suggests that in a frictionless market,
retirement status is irrelevant to the portfolio choice. Bodie et al. (1992) show that, with non-tradable
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ment effect, to the best of our knowledge, is under-explored.2 Since individuals’ portfolio
choices after retirement will affect retirees’ income flows, consumption and other economic
decisions that are highly correlated to pension and retirement policies, it is worth exploring
emipirical evidence as to whether and how retirement may affect an individual’s portfolio
choice. To fill this gap in the literature, the goal of this paper is to empirically establish the
causal effect of retirement on portfolio choice and to provide some possible explanations for
this causal effect.
Modeling and estimating models with endogenous retirement decisions pose economic
and econometric challenges. To solve this endogeneity problem, we use data from the Health
Retirement Study (HRS), a national longitudinal survey, and adopt the instrumental variable
approach. We use two sets of instruments for retirement status: historical expected retire-
ment status and eligibility age indicators of retirement benefits (especially, Social Security
benefits). Using these instruments, we find that retirement causes a discrete jump in risky
share holding by roughly 5-7 percentage points. This increase accounts for one fourth of the
increase in risk asset holdings provided that the average risky share is 20.2 percentage points
in our sample. This finding suggests that there exists a positive and sizable retirement effect
on portfolio choice towards risky assets, which cannot be easily explained by the theories
in existing studies.3 In addition, we find substantial heterogeneous retirement effects across
wealth levels and mortgage holdings but no significant heterogeneity on pension holdings.
In terms of wealth, the retirement effect is strongest among individuals in the top one-third
of wealthy households in our sample, while little effect is found for the individuals in the
bottom one-third of poor households. In terms of mortgage, non-mortgage holders exhibit
a larger positive retirement effect on portfolio choice than mortgage holders. No significant
labor income, individuals tend to hold more risky assets while working than after retirement. On the other
hand, Viceira (2001) shows that, with a large correlation between stock market risk and labor market risk,
portfolio choice can be riskier after retirement than prior to retirement. A detailed discussion on this stream
of literature will be provided later.
2A partial list includes Heaton and Lucas (2000), Horneff et al. (2007), and Addoum (2013).
3For example, Samuelson (1969) posits that retirement is uncorrelated to portfolio choice; Bodie et al.
(1992) predict a decrease in risky asset holdings right after retirement; Cocco et al. (2005) argue for a smooth
increase in the risky asset share after retirement.
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difference is found for pension holders versus non-pension holders.
Motivated by these counterintuitive findings, we further propose and test four separate
hypotheses that may explain portfolio choice behaviors: 1) The risk tolerance hypothesis
states that provided risk tolerance is negatively correlated with risky asset holdings, when
retirement itself increases risk tolerance, risky asset holdings will increase;4 2) The time
spending hypothesis suggests that, having more time after retirement to be allocated to
analyzing or tracking risky assets like stocks can increase risky asset holdings. An alternative
scenario under the same hypothesis could be that an increase in utility drawn from additional
time working on risky assets could also increase risky asset holdings; 3) The life expectancy
hypothesis states that retirement results in a pessimistic view of life expectancy which leads
to an increase in risky asset holdings. Specifically, people after retirement stop working and
may not feel to be as capable and active as before and may become pessimistic about their
life expectancy, resulting in an increase in risky asset holdings. In particular, an increase
(decrease) in life expectancy may cause an increase (reduction) in savings and consequently,
decrease (increase) the relative risky shares in the portfolio, as predicted by Cocco and Gomes
(2012); 4) The bequest motive hypothesis states that retirement weakens the bequest motive
and thus increases an individual’s risky asset holding. To be specific, a weaker bequest
motive increases the speed at which wealth is drawn down, and thus decreases the wealth to
labor income ratio. In turn, this will potentially result in an increase in risky portfolio choice,
as predicted by Cocco et al. (2005). Though our results indicate that all four explanations
can contribute to the retirement effect on portfolio choice, to some extend, we predict that
the risk tolerance and time spending hypotheses are likely the main driving forces.5
Within the existing literature, our paper is more closely related to two main streams of
studies. The first stream discusses household portfolio choice under the life-cycle framework.
4This is consistent with Canner et al. (1997), who argue that risk tolerance is negatively correlated to
risky asset allocation.
5Our analysis only captures the net effects from retirement and explanations proposed here are just
possibilities. Structurally decomposing contributions from different channels would be an interesting topic
for future study.
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Of relevance here are the seminal papers by Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971).
From there, follow-up studies have developed in two directions. Some studies do not explicitly
model retirement based on life-cycle and instead only generally discuss portfolio choice over
time (Calvet et al., 2009; Campbell , 2006; Heaton and Lucas , 2000). Other studies have
focused on the effects of demographic and behavioral characteristics on portfolio choice, such
as age (Ameriks and Zeldes , 2004), health (Rosen and Wu, 2004; Edwards , 2008), lifetime
experience of volatility (Malmendier and Nagel , 2011; Appendino, 2013), the expectation
of future borrowing constraints (Guiso et al., 1996), optimism about investment decisions
(Dominitz and Manski , 2007; Puri and Robinson, 2007) and financial literacy (Lusardi and
Mitchell , 2007; Van Rooij et al., 2011).
There also exist a few papers that explicitly model retirement, either exogenously (Vi-
ceira, 2001; Campbell et al., 2001; Cocco et al., 2005; Gomes and Michaelides , 2005) or
endogenously (Bodie et al., 1992, 2004; Farhi and Panageas , 2007; Dybvig and Liu, 2010)
and focus on the discussion on retirement transitions. For example, Cocco et al. (2005) build
up an exogenous retirement model and predict that at retirement individuals may smoothly
adjust their risk portfolio holdings upwards. Farhi and Panageas (2007) endogenize an ir-
reversible retirement choice and show a larger portion of risky assets prior to retirement.
Among these, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) provide theoretical predictions that are close
to our empirical findings. They use the Epstein-Zin utility function and include a fixed
entry cost for risky investment as well as risk aversion heterogeneities in their model. They
find that with certain parameters, there can be a non-smooth shift in risky share at the
exogenous retirement age of 65. While Gomes and Michaelides (2005) provide a possible
scenario of portfolio choice changes close to retirement age, very little explanation for this
jump is offered. From an empirical perspective, Addoum (2013) is the most relevant work
on retirement portfolio choice. This work focuses on the correlation between retirement and
portfolio choice by discussing relative bargaining power between husband and wife within
household rather than establishing causal effects. In Addoum (2013), the author finds a neg-
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ative correlation between retirement and risky portfolio choice, which is the opposite of our
results. Also, the author finds a positive retirement effect of wives and a negative retirement
effect of husbands, which are different from ours, too. However, this paper focuses on the
retirement effect interacted with marital status and only discusses the correlation between
retirement and portfolio choices. Our paper contributes to the literature by empirically es-
tablishing a positive causality of retirement on portfolio choice and further discussing and
testing possible explanations for this retirement effect. In addition, different from Addoum
(2013), which only considers observations with positive risky shares, our analysis uses un-
conditional sample and includes all observations. By doing so, our analysis is able to capture
the household transition from non-risky asset holders to risky asset holders and vice versa
and avoids the sample selection issue.6
Our paper is also related to another stream of studies, which concentrate on other aspects
of economic behavior rather than on portfolio choice around retirement. Some studies in
this area discuss the ”retirement consumption puzzle,” i.e. a downward shift of consumption
at retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg , 1954; Friedman, 1957; Heckman, 1974; Bernheim
et al., 2001; Haider and Stephens Jr , 2007; Battistin et al., 2009).7 Other studies consider
saving behavior (Papke, 2004), housing (Yogo, 2009), pension and annuitization (Brown,
2001) and health care (Hurd and McGarry , 1997). Our paper will complement previous
studies by empirically discussing household investment behavior during the retirement phase.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical
methodology, discussing our benchmark specification and identification strategy. Section 3
discusses data issues and variable definitions. Section 4 presents our main results of the
retirement effect on portfolio choice. Section 5 investigates four possible hypotheses to
explain the retirement effect. Section 6 conducts several robustness checks, and then Section
7 concludes.
6In the data, we find that households which experience such transitions are not rare and count for
approximately 20 percent of all households.
7Attanasio (1999) and Hurst (2008) provide excellent reviews on this topic.
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2.2 Empirical Methodology
2.2.1 Benchmark
We estimate the retirement effect on household portfolio choice. To this end, following a
panel regression approach, we consider the benchmark regression as follows:
Riskyshareit = β0 + β1HHretireit + γ
′X it + δi + ηt + εit (1)
where the dependent variable, Riskyshareit, is household i’s risky share at wave t, which is
measured as the value of risky assets divided by the value of total financial assets. The key
variable of interest, HHretireit, is the head of household i’s retirement status dummy at
wave t. X it contains sets of 1) household characteristics; 2) household head’s characteristics;
and 3) spouse’s characteristics, for household i at wave t, under different specifications.
Household fixed-effects, δi, captures time-invariant factors that are correlated to risk portfolio
choice. ηt represents the wave fixed-effects and εit is the time-varying unobserved disturbance.
We are focusing on the retirement effect on risk portfolio choice, which is captured by β1.
Note that the benchmark specification can estimate the average retirement effect, but it
cannot provide enough information to help us distinguish between two competing sources
for retirement effects. More specifically, we cannot separate the effects in terms of 1) those
who switched from non-risky-asset buying to risky-asset buying after retirement (extensive
margin) or 2) those who owned risky assets before and increase their risky asset holdings after
retirement (intensive margin). To separate these possible features, we conduct two additional
exercises. To test the extensive margin effect, we use a stock market participation indicator
as the dependent variable to run a panel logistic regression model with a similar setting to
Equation (1). To test the intensive margin effect, we follow Equation (1) by restricting our
sample to households with positive risky shares in order to determine whether risky asset
holders increase their risky share after retirement. The results together with ones for the
benchmark regression will be discussed in Section 3.
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2.2.2 Identification Strategy
To establish the causal effect of retirement, we need to solve the endogeneity problem.
Two sources of endogeneity could bias the estimate of the coefficient β1: 1) omitted variable
bias and 2) reverse causality. More specifically, omitted variable endogeneity occurs when
unobserved factors like preference and life style simultaneously affect the retirement deci-
sion and portfolio choice. Simultaneous endogeneity occurs when portfolio choice decisions
reversely affect retirement decisions.
To address the endogeneity issue, we use the instrumental variable approach, which
commonly requires two restrictions: 1) the relevance restriction, which requires that the in-
strumental variables are correlated to the endogenous variable, namely the household head’s
retirement status (HHretireit); and 2) the exclusion restriction, which requires that the
instrumental variable we use is uncorrelated to the error term εit, directly. To satisfy these
two restrictions, we consider two sets of instrumental variables for retirement status.
The first instrument we use, following Haider and Stephens Jr (2007), is the subjective
expected retirement status. We construct this subjective expected retirement status by
comparing the expected retirement age reported in the 1992 wave to the actual age in the
following waves. If the expected retirement age is smaller than the actual age, then the
expected retirement status is classified as ”retired”. Otherwise, the status is ”not retired”.
Based on the rational expectation argument, information known at time t is uncorrelated
with the expectation errors between period t and future periods t+ 1, t+ 2, and so forth, i.e.
the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in Equation (1). Meanwhile, the actual
retirement is just a revised decision based on new and unexpected changes under rational
expectation assumption, which is highly correlated to self-reported retirement expectations
in previous waves.8
8The first-stage regression in Table D.4 in Appendix ensures that the subjective retirement expectation is
highly predictive of subsequent retirement behavior. For robustness, though not reported here, we construct
an alternative expected retirement status by using the lagged expected retirement age instead of using only
the expected retirement age from the 1992 wave. The results are qualitatively the same.
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Following Bonsang et al. (2012), we use two indicators as the second set of instruments:
1) whether an individual pass the minimum age to claim early retirement benefit, and 2)
whether an individual pass the minimum age to claim full retirement benefit. Specifically,
age 62 is the minimum age at which Social Security benefits can be partially claimed, i.e.
early retirement,9 and the age at which individuals can claim full Social Security benefits
varies by different birth cohort.10 These two age thresholds are minimum age requirements
for claiming partial and full social security benefits, respectively, and consequently they are
highly correlated to retirement decisions. The first-stage regression in Table D.4 in Appendix
confirms our conjecture. In terms of the exclusion restriction, since these two age thresholds
are set by the government exogenously and are not affected by individuals, we argue that
these age thresholds are relatively exogenous, and are not correlated to the error terms.11
2.3 Data Description
The data used in this paper is from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudi-
nal survey that collects detailed information on the US population over the age of 50.12 More
specifically, we use the RAND HRS Data file, a cleaned and processed version of the HRS
data. RAND HRS data contain 26,000 household observations with detailed information on
demographics, health, income, wealth, and retirement status. The main advantage of this
data is that it includes 7,700 households, with at least one respondent of each household born
between 1931 and 1941, who has retired or is expected to retire during the survey period
975 percent Social Security benefits can be claimed at age 62 and the proportion increases overtime until
when full benefits can be claimed.
10Note that the normal retirement age is set to increase to age 67 over a 22-year period, which affects
people born on or after January 2nd, 1938. Table D.3 in Appendix shows the normal retirement age for the
different cohorts used for our empirical analysis
11If the error term contains factors that affect an individual’s life expectancy, the exclusion restriction may
not necessarily hold.
12In terms of representativeness, although the HRS was designed to represent the US population over the
age of 50, to address the research regarding racial and ethnic disparities, the HRS has oversampled Black
and Hispanic populations. In this study, we do not adjust the sample regarding race and ethnicity, rather a
subsample of only the white population is examined. The results, though not reported, are qualitatively the
same as our main results.
59
(1992-2010).
Our primary sample draws from the 1992 wave to the 2010 wave in HRS. In order for
our results to be comparable to those in the literature, we restrict our sample based on
the following four criteria: 1) a household with the head between ages 50 and 80;13 2)
households not reporting self-employment; 3) households where retirement status is known;
4) households with a risky share measure between 0 and 1. More detailed sample selection
procedures can be found in Table D.1 in Appendix.
2.3.1 Variable Definitions
Retirement Status
Retirement status is the key variable of interest in our analysis. To measure the retirement
status of each individual, we use the self-reported retirement status in the HRS, which is
constructed from the survey question ”At this time do you consider yourself to be completely
retired, partly retired, or not retired at all?”. For the main analysis, we classify respondents
who self-reported ”completely retired” as retirees.14 The portion of retirees by age is given
in Figure 2.1. As the figure illustrates, the portion of retirees increases significantly between
ages 62 and 65, which is closely related to the eligibility age for Social Security retirement
benefits.15
Risky Shares
We define risky shares as the net value of stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts
divided by total financial assets. Total financial assets are the sum of checking and sav-
ing accounts; money market funds; certificates of deposit (CD); government saving bonds;
treasury bills; corporate, municipal, government, and foreign bonds; and other savings after
13We define the head of a household as the member who earns the most over the entire survey period.
14As an alternative measure of retirement, we treat both the completely and the partly retired groups as
retirees. The results are robust
15Other retirement measures constructed from a labor force participation question are constructed and
tested as robustness check in Section 6. The results are qualitatively the same
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subtracting other debts such as credit card balances, medical debts, and life insurance policy
loans. Financial assets do not include main residence, other real estate, vehicles, businesses,
and Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and Keogh plans.
A caveat of the risky share measure in our main analysis is that, due to data limitation,
we do not include IRA account when calculating the risky share. Because the IRA assets
account for a sizable fraction of retirement assets, excluding them may lead to a less precise
risky share measure. However, the HRS did not collect information about IRA account
until the 2000 wave. Even in the waves of 2000, 2002 and 2004, only limited information
regarding to the portion of stock investments in IRA accounts was collected in roughly three
categories ”Mostly or All Stocks, Mostly or All Interest Earning, and Evenly Split”. The
exact portion of stocks in IRA assets has only been collected since the 2006 wave. To verify
that our results are not driven by the construction of the risky share measure, we analyze
a subsample since 2006 by including the IRA account when measuring the risky share and
the results are qualitatively similar and are reported in Section 6.
Expected Retirement Status
We construct the expected retirement status by following Haider and Stephens Jr (2007).
We first extract the expected retirement age information for each individual in the initial
1992 wave and then compare this expected retirement age to the actual age in the following
waves. If an individual’s expected retirement age is lower than the actual age in a given
wave, we define this individual’s expected retirement status as ”expected to be retired.”
Otherwise, if an individuals’s expected retirement age is higher than the actual age, we label
the expected retirement status as ”expected not to be retired.”16
16As a robustness check, instead of using the expected retirement age reported in 1992 wave, we also
define an alternative expected retirement status by using the expected retirement age asked in one wave
prior. Though not reported here, the results are qualitatively the same.
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Indicators for Early Retirement and Normal Retirement
We define the indicator ”early retirement” as 1 if an individual’s actual age is greater or
equal to 62 and the other indicator ”normal retirement” as 1 if an individual’s actual age is
greater or equal to the minimum age for claiming the full social security benefit, following
Bonsang et al. (2012).
Measure of Risk Tolerance
The risk tolerance measures are constructed from the experimental survey questions
regarding to job choices following Barsky et al. (1997). Specifically, in the 1992 wave, the
risk tolerance is set using the four following levels, listed from least to most risk-averse:
• 1. “R would take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting it in half.”
• 2. “R would take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting it by a third.”
• 3. “R would take a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting it 20%.”
• 4. “R would take or stay in the job that guaranteed current income given any of the
above alternatives.”
Based on the series of questions, the HRS classifies each individual into four different risk
tolerance groups, from the most risk tolerant (scored as 1) to the least risk tolerant (scored
as 4). These questions are not asked in the 1994 and 1996 waves. From the 1998 wave
forward, additional questions are asked that allow two more categories:
• 1a. “Less risk-averse than 1 above: R would take a job with even chances of doubling
income or cutting it by 75%.”
• 4a. “Between categories 3 and 4 above: R would take a job with even chances of
doubling income or cutting it by 10%.”
These additional categories are used to define an alternative 6-category risk tolerance mea-
sure. We use both the 4 and 6 categories risk tolerance measures in our analysis.
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Following the Stock Market
Stock market participation is costly. Time allocation is one type of cost that investors
incur when they participate in the stock market and we conjecture that reducing working
hours allows households to devote more time to stock market and investment decisions. To
capture this, we construct a measure for following the stock market. The HRS provides the
amount of time allocated to stock market using the question: ”How closely do you follow
the stock market: very closely (1) , somewhat (2) , or not at all (3)?” since the 2002 wave.
We use the answers to this question as a categorical measure for the frequency of following
the stock market.
Life Expectancy
As discussed in Puri and Robinson (2007), individuals, who have higher self-reported life
expectancies than the standard, are more likely to invest in stocks. We want to test whether
the retirement effect is driven by a change in an individual’s life expectancy. To do so, we
define the life expectancy measures from two self-reported questions in the HRS.
• 1. ”The probability of living to age 75”
• 2. ”The probability of living to age 85”
We use these two reported probabilities directly as our life expectancy measures.
Probability of Leaving Bequest
Although some economists are skeptical about the effect of the bequest motive on saving
decisions (Hurd (1989); Dynan et al. (2002); Cagetti (2003)), it is more common to assume
that investors with high bequest motives are likely to save more, and that this behavior
in turn leads an individual’s portfolio choice towards more risk (Cocco et al. (2005); Rosen
and Wu (2004)). To test whether the bequest motive changes around retirement, which can
potentially explain the positive change in risky share, we use survey questions regarding to
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the probability of leaving a bequest to construct bequest incentive measures. Beginning in
the 1994 wave, the HRS asked the following question
• 1. “What are the chances that you [or your (husband/wife/partner)] will leave an
inheritance totaling $10, 000 or more?”
If the respondent reports that probability of leaving a bequest of $10, 000 or more is larger
than zero, he or she is further asked
• 2. “What are the chances that you [or your (husband/wife/partner)] will leave an
inheritance totaling $100, 000 or more.”
If the reported probability to the first question is zero, respondents are asked
• 3. “What are the chances that you (and your (spouse/partner)) will leave any inheri-
tance?”
We use these reported probabilities as our three measures for bequest motives.17
Other Control Variables
We use other demographic characteristics and financial status as control variables. One
characteristics is age, which is one of the most important demographic characteristics in
portfolio choice. The relationship between age and portfolio choice has previously been
reported in portfolio choice literature (Ameriks and Zeldes , 2004). We include age and age
squared terms as control variables to distinguish the age effect from the effect of retirement.
In addition to age, such as education, health status, ethnicity, religion, region of residence,
size of household, which may affect the portfolio choice, are also controlled.
Classic portfolio theory assumes non-CRRA utility function and no labor income risk
so that optimal portfolio share should be constant regardless of income and wealth level
17Keep in mind that the first question is an ”unconditional” measure and the last two are ”conditional”
measures, where the second question measures a even stronger bequest motive than that from the first
question and the last question is a weaker measure than that from the first question.
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(Merton (1969); Samuelson (1969)). However, many studies have shown that level of income
and wealth are important factors that affect an individual’s portfolio decision (Cohn et al.
(1975); Donkers and Van Soest (1999); Guiso et al. (2003); Peress (2004)). In light of these
studies, we control the effect of financial status on the portfolio decision, using income level,
wealth level, pension information, and mortgage status as control variables.18
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics according to the retirement status of household
head.19 Part I of the table presents demographic characteristics, and part II summarizes the
financial status. The average age of retirees is 9 years older than that of non-retirees. A
further difference is that retirees are less educated and less healthy than non-retirees. These
differences are statistically significant. In terms of financial status, the average dollar value
of total financial wealth for retirees is almost 50 percent larger than for non-retirees. After
retirement, the income of the former is reduced by 42 percent from an average of $41,000
to $23,800. While most of the summary statistics are consistent with conventional wisdom,
the risky shares show an opposite pattern. Stock share of financial assets for retirees is 2.8
percent higher than that of non-retirees, which amounts to almost a 15 percent increase.
This difference in stock share is statistically significant, but the difference in combined stock
share in financial and IRA assets between the two groups is not statistically significant. The
subjective measure of risk tolerance is also reported in the last two rows, but the difference
is not statistically significant. Other risky shares such as stock shares, and other real estate
shares in total assets are also higher for retirees than for non-retirees.
To understand household asset composition in detail, we summarize the value of each
asset and its portion in total household wealth in Table 2.2. As shown, the housing asset
constitutes the largest portion of total wealth, while the second largest is financial assets,
18All wealth and income data are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) into 2000 dollars.
19In this table, we only report some important variables to our analysis. The detailed summary statistics
can be found in Table D.2 in Appendix.
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which are 19.6 percent of total assets. We also compare the asset composition of retirees
and non-retirees. As shown in Table 2.2, there is no change in relative importance of each
asset before and after retirement. However, the portion of each asset varies. The portions
of relatively liquid assets, including financial, stock, and IRA assets increases, while the
portion of illiquid assets such as home equity, transportation, business, and other real estate
decrease. In particular, the portion of financial assets shows the largest increase in both level
and ratio.
2.4 Main Results
This section presents the main results of this paper. We will first discuss the results of
retirement effect on portfolio choice from the benchmark specification. After establishing the
overall retirement effect, we will further explore whether the retirement effect comes from
intensive margin, i.e. individuals who do not hold risky assets before retirement tend to hold
risky assets after retirement, or from extensive margin, i.e. risky asset holders increase their
risky portfolios after retirement. In addition, we also investigate potential heterogeneities in
terms of wealth, mortgage holdings, and pension holdings.
2.4.1 Benchmark Result
In this subsection, we will discuss the overall pattern of retirement effects identified in the
data. First, we present the rough pattern of how portfolio choice varies with age in Figure
2.2. The risky share increases between age 62 and age 67, where the portion of retirees
increases dramatically. To distinguish the age effect from the retirement effect, we also draw
the fitted line based on estimated risky share of non-retiree by age. Since the fitted line is
not affected by the retirement effect, the gap between the fitted line and the real risky share
can be partially explained by the retirement effect.
To further explore retirement effects, controlling for other factors that could also affect
portfolio choice, we consider the regression analysis that we described in Section 2. The re-
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sults are summarized in Table 2.3. Column 1 provides estimates using the panel regression.
Columns 2 to 4 report the estimates using a different set of instruments.20 Columns 5-8
correspond to Columns 1-4, but include more control variables that capture the spouse’s de-
mographic characteristics, like age, square of age, and self-reported health status. Standard
errors are all clustered at the household level. Table 2.3 shows that the retirement effect
is quite striking and robust across different specifications. The benchmark specification in
Column 1 shows that retired individuals invest approximately 1.3 percentage points more
in risky shares, accounting for about 7.7% of the average risky share holdings. Taking into
account that the estimates in Column 1 might be biased due to endogeneity issues, Columns
2-4 show that when the instrumental variables are used, the retirement effect increases to
about 4.4-6.7 percentage points across different specifications. This accounts for 26% to 40%
of the average risky shares. According to these results, retirement status has a huge impact
on risky portfolio choices.21
Besides the positive retirement effect, we also find that control variables exhibit the
effects, as we expected. Households with more wealth or higher income invest more in risky
assets, which is consistent with predictions from Calvet et al. (2009). Over time, however,
older individuals, in general, invest in risky assets, though this trend reverses at later ages
beginning around 77, consistent with findings in Campbell et al. (2001) and Cocco et al.
(2005). Larger households invest less in risky assets, while households with more children
have a higher percentage of risky shares in their portfolios. Though the sign of the coefficient
is negative, self-reported health status has no significant impact on risk portfolio choice22.
This differs from the findings in Rosen and Wu (2004), who find that health exhibits negative
20The first-stage regression results of our instrumental variables are reported in Table D.4 in Appendix.
All three instrumental variables we use in this paper are, both economically and statistically, significantly
correlated to the actual retirement status.
21Because risky shares are nonnegative, we also estimate Tobit regression models. As shown in Table
D.5 in Appendix, the results are robust across different specifications. We can observe that individuals
after retirement tend to increase their potential risky share holdings by 5.4 percentage points in the panel
regression specification and 6.5 to 12.6 percentage points in different IV specifications. The results without
controlling for the spouse’s characteristics exhibit a similar pattern.
22For the robustness check, we also run the regression without controlling for the health status of head or
spouse. The results are similar to the benchmark table.
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effects on risk portfolio choice. The difference between our results and those of Rosen and
Wu (2004) might be due to different sampling periods and sample selection rules. While
the sample for the benchmark analysis includes both married and single households, marital
status changes during survey periods due to various reasons such as marriage, divorce, and
death of spouse. Marital status change may affect risky investment behavior. To controlling
for the effect of marital status change, we include the dummy for marital status change:
households that change martial status are indicated as ”1” and households that remain the
same are indicated as ”0”. The results show that marital status change does not affect the
risky share significantly.23
2.4.2 Extensive Margin vs. Intensive Margin
In the previous subsection, we have found that there is a positive retirement effect on
risky portfolio choice. In this subsection, we further investigate whether this retirement
effect is driven by an extensive margin or intensive margin, as we introduced in Section 2.
To explore this, we use the rich data provided by the HRS.
To test extensive margin, we first define a risky asset holding indicator. We classify
households as risky asset holders if they hold any positive risky assets, and non-risky asset
holders if they do not hold any. Though this definition does not distinguish stock holdings
from mutual fund holdings, it is still a good approximation of household risky asset market
participation. We then run the panel logit regression with the indicator of risky asset holders
as a dependent variable. The results are shown in Column 1 of Table 2.4. As can be seen
in the table, households are more likely to invest in the stock market after retirement than
before. This finding is statistically significant at the 1% level. By calculation, the marginal
effect of retirement is 1.8 percent. Part of the retirement effect can be attributed to the fact
that some households become risky asset investors after retirement.
23In addition to the marital status change, we also include marital status, whether single or married, as
control variable. Including marital status as control variable instead of marital status change does not change
the effect of retirement on stock share.
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To test intensive margin, we first focus on households with only positive risky assets.
The result is reported in Column 2 of Table 2.4, which does not show any significant sta-
tistical difference. However, as we know, restricting our analysis only on conditional sample
may incur sample selection problem, which could be problematic. To deal with this issue,
we further conduct the Heckman selection model under a panel data setting. The result is
shown in Column 3 of Table 2.4. It is shown that after dealing with the sample selection
issue, households increase 1.7 percent risky shares after retirement and this effect is statis-
tically significant. It indicates that the increase in intensive margin also contributes to the
retirement effect we found in the benchmark results.
In short, we find that this retirement effect comes from both extensive margin and inten-
sive margin. In other words, retirees who refrained from buying risky assets before retirement
tend to buy them after retirement, and those who held risky assets before retirement increase
the share after retirement. We do not try to decompose and quantify each effect in this paper,
but this would be an interesting investigation for future studies.
2.4.3 Heterogeneities
We may expect the retirement effect to be heterogeneous across different characteristics.
Here, we explore the potential heterogeneities regarding 1) wealth; 2) mortgage holding; and
3) pension holding.
2.4.3.1 Heterogeneities by Wealth
Among all possible characteristics, the retirement effect is more likely to be different
across wealth levels. Intuitively speaking, individuals from households with a limited budget
can allocate money only to support themselves, and may not be able to buy any risky assets.
In light of this constraint, changes in portfolio choice are less likely to occur after retirement.
In contrast, for individuals from wealthier households, who have more flexibility in allocating
money towards different portfolio choices, changes in the portfolio choice are more likely to
69
occur after retirement. Taking this into account, we will explore the possible heterogeneity
across different wealth levels.
We split each wave sample evenly into three groups according to wealth: high, medium,
and low. We first plot the average risky shares of the three groups in relation to retirement
status across different ages. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, in the high wealth group, retirees
in general have larger risky share holdings than do non-retirees. For this group, the pattern
is robust across different ages. The medium and low wealth groups, on the other hand, do
not exhibit any substantial difference between retirees and non-retirees.
To examine the heterogeneity across wealth levels, we also conduct regression analyses,
including both panel regression and IV panel regression as before.24 The results are summa-
rized in Table 2.5. The low wealth group is omitted as a reference group in all specifications.
Column 1 provides the results in simple panel regression. The result shows that the retire-
ment effect can be attributed mainly to the high wealth group, where the coefficient on the
interaction term of the high wealth group indicator and the retirement indicator is positive,
although results in Column 2 and 4 are only statistically significant.
2.4.3.2 Heterogeneity by Mortgage Holdings
Like wealth, the retirement effect is also likely to be heterogenous in terms of mortgage
holdings. The idea is that since mortgage holders need to pay back their mortgages even
after retirement, mortgage holders 1) may not have enough money to invest in risky assets
and 2) may not be willing to invest more in risky assets, which would mean bearing more
risk. If this is the case, we expect that the retirement effect for mortgage holders will be
smaller than that for non-mortgage holders.
Here we consider two measures to examine the heterogeneous retirement effects. For the
first measure, we classify households with any mortgage as mortgage holders and the rest
24When we conduct an instrumental variables regression analysis for specifications with retirement-wealth
interactions, we instrument these interactions by interactions between our instrumental variables and wealth
indicators. Similar settings are adopted for other heterogeneity tests.
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as non-mortgage holders. We define this dummy variable as the first measure of mortgage
holding. For the second measure, we use the natural log of mortgage reported in the HRS
data as a continuous measure of mortgage holdings.
Table 2.6 provides the regression similar to Table 2.5. Columns 1 to 4 report the results
using the first measure and Columns 5 to 8 report the results using the second measure.
As shown in Table 2.6, the coefficient of the interaction term between the mortgage dummy
and the retirement status dummy is negative, though it is statistically significant only for
non-IV specification. Based upon these coefficients, we calculate that the retirement effect
on risky share holdings for non-mortgage holders is 1.4 percentage points higher in the panel
regression and 0.8-2.2 percentage points higher in the IV setting than for mortgage holders.
Similar patterns can be found by using the second measure.
2.4.3.3 Heterogeneity by Pension Holdings
Pension holdings is another factor that could possibly lead to the heterogeneous retire-
ment effect. The constant benefit flow from pension could have different impact on pension
holders and non-pension holders for their investment choices, and in turn influence the re-
tirement effect differently across pension holders and non-pension holders.
Here, in order to examine heterogeneity retirement effect across pension holding, we
consider one pension measure to classify the household into pension holders and non-pension
holders. More specifically, we classify households as pension holders if they report any type
of patterned benefit and the rest as non-pension holders.25 We interact the pension dummy
with retirement status as an additional variable. Table 2.7 shows that there is no significant
difference between pension holders and non-pension holders, except the result in Column 3.26
This indicates that differences in retirement income flows cannot explain the retirement effect.
Ideally, we would also explore heterogeneity across different pension schemes. However, since
25From our definition, pension holder indicator is time invariant, thus it is automatically omitted in our
panel regression.
26This is also evidence that the retirement effect is not driven by differences in post-retirement income
flows due to different retirement benefit schemes.
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there is limited information in HRS, we will leave this for future study.
2.5 Possible Explanations for the Retirement Portfolio Choice
Puzzle
The previous section has established that there exists a sizable retirement effect on house-
hold risky asset investment. This result is very robust across different specifications and
cannot be explained by existing theories. In this section, we further propose and test four
possible explanations for this positive retirement effect. One caveat, these represent only
four out of many possible explanations.27
2.5.1 Changes in Risk Tolerance
Many factors, like age, wealth, health status, and working status, can affect risk tol-
erance. Now, provided that risk tolerance is positively correlated to risky asset holdings
(Canner et al., 1997), when retirement itself increases risk tolerance, the increased risk tol-
erance boosts the chance that individuals will invest more in risky assets. More specifically,
before retirement, individuals encounter many other uncertainties, including employment
uncertainty, labor income uncertainty, and so forth. Given these uncertainties, individuals
have lower risk tolerance and so maintain fewer risky asset holdings. In contrast, after re-
tirement, those work-related uncertainties disappear, prompting individuals to be more risk
tolerant and invest more in risky assets.
To test this risk tolerance hypothesis, we employ the risk tolerance measure proposed
by Barsky et al. (1997), which is constructed from a series of hypothetical questions on the
comparison of a job with a fixed wage to jobs with wage uncertainties. More specifically,
this measure is defined into two categorical variables: a categorical variable from 1 to 4,
and a categorical variable from 1 to 6. Note that the smaller the number, the more risk
27For example, tax concerns might be another possible channel, which we do not discuss here due to a
lack of data.
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tolerant the households. Since both measures are categorical variables, we consider both the
ordered logit regression and the panel regression. The results of the ordered logit regression
are reported in Columns 1 and 3 and the results of the panel regression are presented in
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.8.28 Across all specifications using different measures, we can
observe that households have a higher risk tolerance after retirement than before retirement,
which is consistent to our conjecture above.
Although the cardinal proxy for risk tolerance provides the evidence that the risk pref-
erence shifts after retirement, using this cardinal proxy to study household behavior raises
issues including measurement error problem (Kimball et al., 2008). To overcome these issues,
Kimball et al. (2008) develop an imputation method. Following their imputation methodol-
ogy, we impute the relative risk tolerance for retirees and non-retirees separately under the
assumption that the risk preference would change after retirement. Table 2.9 shows the result
of regressions of imputed risk tolerance measures on retirement status. As first and second
columns of the table show, imputed risk tolerance and log risk tolerance measures become
higher after retirement. Similarly, households have a lower risk aversion coefficient after
retirement. The results with imputed risk tolerance measures also confirm that households
become more risk tolerant after retirement.
2.5.2 Time Spending
Next, we consider how the availability of more time, associated with retirement, might
drive the retirement effect. As we know, individuals have more time after retirement for
keeping track of risky asset markets and they might even gain utilities during the trading
process of risky assets. If this is the case, individuals would be likely to invest more in the
risky assets once they have more time after retirement.
28Since 2000, the HRS surveyed these income gamble questions to the individuals less than age 65. Thus,
our samples contain only about 15% of respondents above 65 for the four-category risk measure, and 19%
above 65 for the six-category risk measure. To deal with the possible bias caused by this sample selection,
we conduct the same analysis using the subsample before survey year 2000. The result with the subsample,
which is reported in Table D.6 in Appendix B, shows the similar pattern, although the statistical significance
is reduced due to a substantial drop in the sample size.
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To test this hypothesis, we use one measure, tracking the stock market, in HRS. This
measure is drawn from the question ”How closely do you track the stock market: very closely,
somewhat closely and never.” The value of this measure is assigned as 1, 2 or 3, respectively.
A smaller number means more closeness. We again use the ordered logit regression and the
results appear in Column 5 of Table 2.8. We find that retirement does increase the closeness
of tracking the stock market, which supports the time spending hypothesis.
2.5.3 Life Expectancy
As suggested by Cocco and Gomes (2012), individuals who have a longer life expectancy
plan for a longer horizon, and accordingly they will allocate more of their assets to saving,
switching their portfolio towards a lower risk. If retirement changes an individual’s percep-
tion about her life expectancy, then this could possibly affect her portfolio choice. To be
specific, it is possible that when an individual is working, she feels healthy and capable.
Once retired, she may feel less healthy and less capable, thus reducing her life expectancy.
This pessimistic view on life expectancy after retirement would potentially lead to a decrease
in savings and an increase in risky assets.
To determine whether the retirement effect could occur in response to changes in antici-
pated life expectancy, we examine whether retirement decreases anticipated life expectancy
across different levels of optimism. Here we use the self-reported probability of living to
ages 75 and 85 as subject life expectancy to test this hypothesis. The results are given in
columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.8. As shown, on average, individuals tend to perceive a lower life
expectancy after retirement. In particular, retirement decreases the individual’s expectation
of living to age 75 by 0.8 percent, and the individual’s expectation of living to 85 by 5.4
percent. Such results support the conclusion that the retirement effect could be caused by a
decrease in retiree anticipated life expectancy, though not all of them are not all statistically
significant.
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2.5.4 Bequest Motives
We may also expect that retirement could weaken bequest motives, which in turn might
increase the probability that households invest in more risky assets.29 When individuals
are employed, they may consider themselves in a better financial situation, giving them a
stronger bequest motive. Once retired, individuals would experience a sudden loss of labor
income and may view themselves less capable than before. In particular, this view of weaker
self may weaken the bequest motive. If this is the case, changes in bequest motive may be
another possible explanation for the retirement effect.
Bequest motives in the HRS are measured using a sequence of questions. Individuals were
firstly asked whether they intend to leave a bequest of $10K or above and the probability of
doing so. If the probability of leaving a bequest of $10K is positive, then individuals were
asked whether they intend to leave a bequest of $100K or above and the probability. However,
if the probability of leaving a bequest of $10K is zero, individuals were asked whether they
want to leave any bequest and with what probability. We treat each of these questions as
a different measure of bequest motives. We regress these three measures of bequest motives
on retirement. The results are shown in Columns 8 to 10 of Table 2.8. A relatively weaker
bequest motive is found after retirement though it is not statistically significant except for
the question of leaving any. Although the evidence is relatively weak, these findings suggest
that a weaker bequest motive is also a possible explanation that leads to an increase in risky
share holding after retirement.
2.6 Robustness
In this section, we will present various robustness checks including: 1) adopting an alter-
native risky share definition by incorporating IRA accounts; 2) using an alternative retire-
ment status which classifies partial retirement as ”retired”; 3) including both the household
29Cocco et al. (2005) argue that people with stronger bequest motive draw down their wealth more slowly
and this, in turn, results in a lower risky share.
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head’s retirement status and the spouse’s retirement status simultaneously; 4) excluding an-
other possible explanation of market-driven passive asset holdings; 5) further exploring the
potential non-linear effect of age, income, and wealth; 6) conducting a placebo test by arti-
ficially assigning ”forced retirement age;” 7) distinguishing the short-term versus long-term
retirement effect by examining the retirement effect interacted with retirement durations.
2.6.1 Alternative Risky Share Definition
In the previous sections, we focused on the risky share measure defined by the ratio of
risky assets (stocks and mutual funds) to total financial assets, where financial assets do not
include retirement accounts. One may argue that when making portfolio choice decisions,
individuals will not only take their non-retirement financial assets into account, but also
consider their retirement accounts, in their total assets. To address this concern, we use an
alternative risky share measure by including the IRA account and its respective portion in
stocks. This new risky share measure is defined as (stocks + mutual funds + IRA stocks)/
(financial assets+IRA).30 The new results are summarized in Table 2.10. It shows that the
retirement effect maintains and this effect is quantitatively similar to the results obtained
using our initial risky share definition. In other words, our results are robust to risk portfolio
measure both with and without taking into account the retirement account.
2.6.2 Alternative Retirement Definition
In Section 4 and Section 5, we used self-reported retirement status and only treat indi-
viduals as retired if they report ”fully-retired.” Although there is no formal verification of an
individual’s retirement status, there are a set of alternative measures that can be used for
robustness checks. We will present the results with different retirement measures in Table
2.11. In Column 1, we use the same measure as in Section 4 and Section 5. In Column 2, we
30Since the HRS only includes IRA account information since 2000, and only precise asset allocation
information from the 2006 wave samples; using the new risky share measure will make our sample size much
smaller than our original definition.
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define a new retirement status by including both fully-retired and partially-retired individ-
uals as retirees. In Columns 3 and 4, we build up the retirement measures from a question
about labor force participation. This question is ”What is your current labor force status:
working, unemployment, not in labor market, disabled, partially retired, fully retired?”. To
define retirement status, we exclude individuals who are either ”not in labor market” or
”disabled” from our sample. Similar to the retirement definitions used in Columns 1 and 2,
we classify an individual as a retiree if he reports labor force participation as ”fully-retired”.
In Columns 3 and in Column 4, we classify an individual as a retiree if he reports labor
force participation as either ”fully retired” or ”partially retired”. As shown in Table 2.11,
the retirement effect is robust to different retirement status definitions.
2.6.3 Spouse’s Retirement Status
Another concern about the retirement effect stems from the fact that men and women
differ with respect to their risk aversion, which affects their investment decisions (Barber and
Odean, 2001; Addoum, 2013). To address this concern, we estimate the retirement effect by
including both male household heads’ retirement status and their spouses’ retirement status
in our estimation equation at the same time. Table 2.12 shows that the positive retirement
effect is only driven by the household head’s retirement status. The spouse’s retirement
negatively contributes to portfolio choice although the coefficients are not significant for all
specifications.31 These results indicate potential gender differences in portfolio choice during
the transition into retirement, which was evaluated by Addoum (2013). However, our results
based on unconditional samples are opposite to his results from samples with positive risky
shares.
31In the instrumental variable estimations, we construct the spouse’s expected retirement status and age
indicators as IVs for the spouse’s retirement status in the same spirit as instruments defined for the household
head’s retirement status.
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2.6.4 Passive Holdings
Passive holdings occur when the stock market crashes and stock prices decline sharply.
In this scenario, individuals with stock holdings might be reluctant to sell their stocks at
such low prices. When this happens at the same time as retirement, this confounding effect
of passive holding might be misinterpreted as the retirement effect. To distinguish the
retirement effect from the passive holding effect, we firstly control the wave fixed-effects in
our regression. Additionally, we conduct subsample regressions which drop the observation
in the 2008 to 2010 waves to avoid the potential passive holding effect caused by the 2008-
2009 crisis. These results, displayed in Table 2.13, do not show any significant difference
from those obtained by using the full sample, which suggests that the retirement effect is
not driven by the crisis.32
2.6.5 High Order Effects in Age, Income and Wealth
Age, income, and wealth may affect risky share holding nonlinearly. Though we controlled
for age, income, wealth in both linear and square terms, this might not be sufficient to
capture the high order effects if any.33 To explicitly exclude this possibility, we use different
specifications to add further higher order terms in our regression by using age, age square,
age cubic and age quadratic terms, log of income, log income square, log of wealth and
log wealth square. As shown in Table 2.14, after controlling these high order terms, our
retirement effect still maintains.
2.6.6 Placebo Test
Since HRS data is constructed solely from self-reported answers to survey questions, there
might be some potential reporting errors. More specifically, imagine that when individuals
tend to misreport their retirement status, the retirement effect we obtained in the previous
32For the internet bubble crisis of early 2000, we also conduct a similar subsample test by restricting our
sample up to the 2000 wave. The results are qualitatively similar.
33We also use specification with log terms
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section might be driven by some unobserved factors that determine reported retirement status
rather than actual retirement status. To address this issue, we conduct some placebo tests.
We artificially set ”fixed” retirement ages, above which people will be labeled as ”retirees”.
Under each specification, we set a fixed retirement age, which are 62 to 70 in Column 1 to
Column 9, respectively. If the retirement effect is not driven by other unobserved factors that
may affect the reported retirement status, we should not expect significant retirement effects
from our placebo tests. The results are reported in Table 2.15. We find that this ”artificial”
retirement is only effective when set at age 65, the minimum legal age for full retirement
benefits, by which the portion of retirees is increased rapidly. The placebo tests in Table 14
indicate that our results are not driven by other potential factors and thus indirectly support
our main findings of the retirement effect on the portfolio choice.
2.6.7 Retirement Duration
In the benchmark panel regression, we show that retirees hold larger risky shares in their
portfolios than non-retirees do. Although this result is statistically significant and remains
valid with various specifications, there is one limitation to this panel regression. This panel
regression with a retirement dummy only shows that the overall risky share throughout
retirement is higher than the risky share before retirement, which is silent about how risky
share changes by retirement duration. To overcome this limitation and test how risky share
changes by retirement duration, we conduct an additional regression of the risky share on
retirement duration dummies. The retirement duration is defined by the period between the
interview year and the retirement year. For example, for retirees who participated in the
2010 wave survey and reported that she/he had retired in year 2009, the retirement duration
is 1 year in the 2010 wave. Because the HRS is a longitudinal survey, we can also estimate
the retirement duration for individuals who are not retired in a particular survey wave, but
report being retired in a later wave. In this case, the retirement duration is negative. This
duration dummy regression tells us how the risky share changes over time after retirement.
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The regression equation to be estimated is:
Riskyshareit = β0 +
15∑
k=−4
β1kDikt + γ
′X it + ηi + it
where Dikt is a dummy variable that indicates whether individual i has been retired for k
years in year t (a retirement duration dummy), and other specifications are the same as
in the benchmark regression. In this analysis, we restrict our sample to individuals whose
retirement duration is between -5 and 15, and we omit the dummy for the retirement duration
-5 to make these individuals the control group.
Figure 2.4 plots the coefficient β1k and its 95% confidence intervals. As can be seen in
the figure, there is a distinct jump between the retirement duration 0 and 1. After the jump,
the coefficients remain relatively stable. In other words, individuals increase their risky
share at retirement and maintain that increased risky share at the beginning of retirement
and throughout the retirement. On the other hand, coefficients prior to retirement are all
insignificant. This result strengthens our hypothesis that retirement causes a discrete jump
in risky share holdings.
2.7 Conclusion
To sum up, our paper first explores the positive causal effect of retirement on risky asset
holdings, after correcting the endogeneity bias associated with retirement status. We find
that retirement leads to approximately a 5.4-6.7 percentage point increase in the risky shares
of household’s portfolio holdings, accounting for approximately one fourth of the increase
in risk asset holdings. In addition, from the estimation distinguishing retirement duration,
we find that this increase mainly occurs right after the retirement and then maintains over
time. These results support positive increase pattern of risky asset holding over time periods
as predicted by a stream of theories, but are not consistent with the smoothed transition
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pattern as suggested by these theories.34
To further explore this retirement effect on portfolio choices, we then propose and test
four possible hypotheses that could explain this sizable shift due to retirement. We show that
this retirement effect can be associated with four possible scenarios: 1) higher risk tolerance,
2) more time to track risky asset markets, 3) perception of shorter life expectancy, and 4)
lower bequest motives, the first two of which are stronger and more robust. One caveat is
that we cannot distinguish these scenarios simultaneously.
There are several possible directions that we will explore in further work. First, we will
develop a sensible theoretical model that could reconcile such a large positive retirement
effect. Second, as retirement is associated with decreased income risk, it is also worth
discussing how the decrease in income risk affects portfolio choice. Thirdly, we try to find the
richer data that could allow us to distinguish four channels proposed above simultaneously.
34This stream of literature includes Viceira (2001), Cocco et al. (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
and Cocco and Gomes (2012).
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Figure 2.1: Retirement Age
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Notes: This graph is based on the aggregate samples in the HRS from the 1992 wave to the
2010 wave. To identify the retirement status, the self-reported retirement status is used.
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Figure 2.2: Risky Share by Age
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Notes: This graph is based on the aggregate samples in the HRS from the 1992 wave to the
2010 wave. The risky share is the share of total value of stock in financial assets. To reduce
the noise in the data, moving average (with ±1 age window) is used. Non-retiree sample is
used to estimate the fitted line, which shows the patter of risky share by age. The formula
for the fitted line is RiskyShare = −0.2226 + 0.0132 ∗ Age− 0.0001 ∗ Age2.
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Figure 2.3: Risky Share by Age and Wealth Group
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Notes: This graph is based on the aggregate samples in the HRS from the 1992 wave to
the 2010 wave. The risky share is the share of total value of stock in financial assets. The
wealth group is based on the total value of household assets including financial assets and
housing assets. To identify the retirement status, the self-reported retirement status is used.
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Figure 2.4: Coefficients of the Retirement Duration in the Risky Share Regression
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Non Retired Retired Difference
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Part I. Demographic Characteristics
Age
Head 60.2 6.43 69.6 6.45 -9.41 .044***
Spouse 58.7 7.77 66.8 7.77 -8.17 .060***
Size of Household 2.48 1.20 2.15 0.99 .336 .008***
Number of Children 3.09 1.96 3.21 2.08 -.120 .014***
Year of Schooling
Head 13.2 2.93 12.5 3.13 .625 .021***
Spouse 12.7 2.87 12.3 2.67 .391 .022***
Self-Reported Health Status (Head)
Head
1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good .142 .349 .308 .462 -.166 .003***
1:Poor/Fair/Good, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good .459 .498 .631 .483 -.171 .003***
Spouse
1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good .207 .405 .245 .430 -.037 .003***
1:Poor/Fair/Good, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good .513 .500 .553 .497 -.040 .004***
Part I. Financial Status
Wealth ($10,000; 2000 Dollars)
Total Asset 26.6 31.6 33.05 35.34 -6.41 .227***
Total Asset Excluding 2nd Residence 25.4 29.9 31.6 33.5 -6.20 .215***
Total Financial Asset 6.07 11.2 9.13 13.8 -3.06 .085***
Total Stock Asset 2.32 5.82 3.40 7.06 -1.08 .085***
Income ($10,000; 2000 Dollars)
Total Income of Household 6.21 4.01 3.86 3.08 2.35 .025***
Total Income of Head 3.66 1.93 2.17 1.49 1.49 .012***
Total Income of Spouse 1.03 1.12 .683 .804 .344 .007***
Risky Share
Stock Share in Financial Asset .168 .305 .192 .322 -.024 .002***
Stock Share in Financial and IRA Asset .231 .336 .233 .339 -.002 .003
Subjective Measure of Risk Tolerance
1: Least Risk Averse; 4: Most Risk Averse 3.31 1.05 3.28 1.09 .028 .017
1: Least Risk Averse; 6: Most Risk Averse 4.64 1.49 4.70 1.55 -.058 .030
Notes: Wealth and income data are winsorized at the top 5 percent and bottom 5 percent level. The asterisk
in the last column report the significance of t-test. The significant level is as follows.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level,* Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Household Assets
Value of Assets ($1,000) Composition of Assets
Mean S.D. Median Min Max Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Total
IRA 39.4 70.3 0.0 0.0 240 0.099 0.156 0.000 0.000 1.000
Stock 29.4 67.5 0.0 0.0 250 0.057 0.119 0.000 0.000 1.000
Financial Asset 78.5 132.4 17 -7.0 490 0.209 0.268 0.134 -1.000 1.000
Home Equity 103.0 98.4 75 0.0 350 0.419 0.296 0.384 0.000 1.000
Transportation 14.0 12.7 10 0.0 45 0.105 0.161 0.050 0.000 1.000
Business 5.4 21.4 0.0 0.0 100 0.013 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.996
Other Real Estate 15.5 42.2 0.0 0.0 170 0.038 0.106 0.000 0.000 1.000
Total Assets 322.6 372.6 179.5 0.0 1398 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Non-retirees
IRA 33.4 63.7 0.0 0.0 240 0.095 0.156 0.000 0.000 1.000
Stock 23.8 60.0 0.0 0.0 250 0.052 0.116 0.000 0.000 1.000
Financial Asset 62.5 116.6 12 -7.0 490 0.179 0.257 0.108 -1.000 1.000
Home Equity 94.7 94.5 69 0.0 350 0.429 0.296 0.402 0.000 1.000
Transportation 14.2 12.5 10 0.0 45 0.119 0.166 0.061 0.000 1.000
Business 6.3 22.8 0.0 0.0 100 0.016 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.996
Other Real Estate 15.6 42.0 0.0 0.0 170 0.043 0.115 0.000 0.000 1.000
Total Assets 284.7 347.1 152.0 0.0 1398 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Retirees
IRA 46.5 76.8 0.0 0.0 240 0.103 0.157 0.000 0.000 1.000
Stock 36.0 74.7 0.0 0.0 250 0.063 0.123 0.000 0.000 1.000
Financial Asset 97.2 146.5 25.5 -7.0 490 0.242 0.276 0.175 -1.000 1.000
Home Equity 112.8 101.9 87 0.0 350 0.408 0.295 0.360 0.000 1.000
Transportation 13.8 13.0 10.0 0.0 45 0.090 0.152 0.040 0.000 1.000
Business 4.4 19.5 0.0 0.0 100 0.009 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.745
Other Real Estate 15.3 42.6 0.0 0.0 170 0.032 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.999
Total Assets 366.4 395.5 220.0 0.0 1398 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: All asset values are winsorized at bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent level and deflated into 2000
Dollars. We classify the samples into two groups, Retirees and Non-retirees, based on the self-reported
retirement status of household head. Households whose head reports completely retired are classified into
Retirees while households whose head reports partially retired or not retired are classified into Non-retirees.
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Table 2.4: Extensive and Intensive Margin Analysis
Panel Logit Panel Conditional Panel Conditional
on Participation on Participation
(Heckman Selection Model)
(1) (2) (2)
Head Completely Retired 0.155*** 0.006 0.017*
[0.048] [0.007] [0.010]
Head Age -0.106 -0.018*** -0.027***
[0.000] [0.006] [0.008]
Head Age Square 0.001** 0.000 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Head Self-Reported Health -0.005 0.007 0.007
(1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good) [0.054] [0.009] [0.009]
Household Size -0.085*** -0.001 -0.008
[0.024] [0.004] [0.006]
Number of Children 0.169*** 0.017** 0.030***
[0.047] [0.007] [0.010]
ln(Household Income+1) 0.464*** -0.005 0.031
[0.034] [0.005] [0.021]
ln(Household Wealth+1) 0.726*** 0.014*** 0.075**
[0.031] [0.005] [0.034]
Change Marital Status 0.065 -0.028 -0.022
[0.331] [0.049] [0.049]
Spouse Age 0.026
[0.039]
Spouse Age Square -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Spouse Self-Reported Health 0.029 -0.007 -0.005
(1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VeryGood/Good) [0.053] [0.008] [0.008]
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28851 23954 23954
Chi-square 1739.72
Wald p-value 0.00
R-squared 0.02 0.02
F-Statistics 11.73 11.36
Notes: The dependent variable for the Logit Regression is the probability of participating in stock market.
For the intensive margin analysis, the stock share conditional on stock market participation is used as a
dependent variable. In the Logit Regression, sample with no within household variation are dropped (29,436
observations). Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity - Wealth
Panel IV1 IV2 IV3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head Completely Retired 0.008 0.016 0.056** 0.041
[0.006] [0.030] [0.023] [0.026]
Household Wealth High 0.108*** 0.078*** 0.105*** 0.076***
[0.006] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011]
Household Wealth Medium 0.042*** 0.021** 0.047*** 0.022**
[0.005] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009]
Head Completely Retired × Wealth High 0.011 0.043** 0.005 0.038**
[0.007] [0.020] [0.014] [0.018]
Head Completely Retired × Wealth Medium -0.005 0.024 -0.020 0.020
[0.007] [0.019] [0.013] [0.018]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65750 27888 61930 27421
R-square 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
F-Statistics 64.47 34.51 61.74 33.62
Endogeneity Test Statistics 4.63 5.08 11.19
p-value 0.20 0.17 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial assets. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneity - Pension
Panel IV1 IV2 IV3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head Completely Retired 0.011* 0.061* 0.083*** 0.078***
[0.007] [0.034] [0.029] [0.030]
Head Completely Retired × Pension Holder 0.004 -0.007 -0.037** -0.008
[0.007] [0.022] [0.019] [0.020]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65750 27888 61930 27421
R-square 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
F-Statistics 49.64 30.79 47.65 30.28
Endogeneity Test Statistics 2.86 6.97 8.61
p-value 0.24 0.03 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial assets. Standard errors are in
parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the
10 percent level.
92
T
a
b
le
2
.8
:
C
h
an
n
el
T
es
t
R
is
k
T
o
le
ra
n
ce
F
o
ll
ow
in
g
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
L
iv
in
g
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
L
ea
v
in
g
B
eq
u
es
t
4
C
at
.
6
C
a
t.
S
to
ck
M
a
rk
et
T
o
A
g
e
7
5
T
o
A
g
e
8
5
1
0
K
+
1
0
0
K
+
A
n
y
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
H
ea
d
C
om
p
le
te
ly
R
et
ir
ed
-0
.2
05
**
*
-0
.1
99
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
5
*
*
-0
.3
4
2
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
5
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
0
0
.4
3
5
-1
.3
3
6
*
*
*
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
5
7
]
[0
.1
0
8
]
[0
.0
4
5
]
[0
.0
0
7]
[0
.0
1
1
]
[0
.3
9
9
]
[0
.6
6
7
]
[0
.4
2
1
]
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
H
ea
d
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
p
ou
se
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
t
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
15
90
4
15
90
4
9
9
5
4
9
9
5
4
1
8
5
7
6
3
6
7
0
0
3
8
2
1
5
5
6
4
5
9
3
1
0
1
6
3
1
4
1
8
P
se
u
d
o
R
-s
q
u
ar
e
0.
01
0
.0
1
0
.0
7
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e
20
4.
51
2
1
9
.6
9
1
2
7
1
.0
8
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
2
F
-S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
4
6
.4
3
6
0
.0
7
2
4
.1
4
2
3
.8
9
1
2
.3
0
N
ot
es
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
su
lt
of
te
st
in
g
4
p
o
ss
ib
le
ex
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ri
sk
y
sh
a
re
a
ft
er
re
ti
re
m
en
t.
A
s
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
w
in
th
e
ta
b
le
,
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
th
e
su
b
je
ct
iv
e
ri
sk
to
le
ra
n
ce
m
ea
su
re
,
ti
m
e
a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
to
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
,
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
ed
li
fe
ex
p
ec
ta
n
cy
,
a
n
d
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
le
av
in
g
b
eq
u
es
t,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
In
th
e
co
lu
m
n
(1
),
(3
),
a
n
d
(5
),
th
e
o
rd
er
ed
lo
g
ic
re
g
re
ss
io
n
is
u
se
d
.
T
h
e
p
a
n
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
is
u
se
d
in
th
e
o
th
er
co
lu
m
n
s.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
A
ll
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
le
ve
l.
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
1
p
er
ce
n
t
le
ve
l,
**
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
p
er
ce
n
t
le
ve
l,
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
.
93
Table 2.9: Channel Test - Imputed Risk Tolerance Measure
Risk Tolerance Log Risk Tolerance Risk Aversion
(1) (2) (3)
Head Completely Retired 0.007** 0.030* -0.206*
[0.004] [0.016] [0.120]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12770 12770 12770
R-square 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes: As shown in the first row in the table, the dependent variables are the imputed risk toler-
ance measure, the imputed log risk tolerance measure, and the imputed risk aversion coefficient,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household
level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10
percent level.
Table 2.10: Robustness - Alternative Risk Measure
(1) (2)
Head Completely Retired 0.063*** 0.023**
[0.006] [0.010]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect No Yes
Observations 18459 18459
R-square 0.17 0.01
F-Statistics 239.65 11.30
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial and IRA assets. Standard errors are in
parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.11: Robustness - Alternative Definition of Retirement
Self-Reported Retirement Status Labor Force Status
Completely Completely/Partially Completely Completely/Partially
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head Retired 0.015*** 0.013** 0.011** 0.013**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65750 65750 64636 64636
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
F-Statistics 46.94 46.68 46.67 46.63
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial asset. In the first two columns, the retirement
dummy is created using the self-reported retirement status. In the last two columns, the retirement
dummy is created using the labor force status, and the unemployed and the disabled groups are excluded.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
Table 2.12: Robustness - Retirement Status of Spouse
Panel IV1 IV2 IV3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head Completely Retired 0.017*** 0.106** 0.059* 0.076*
[0.005] [0.046] [0.031] [0.041]
Spouse Completely Retired 0.003 -0.070 -0.059** -0.052
[0.004] [0.055] [0.029] [0.044]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 52435 52435 47467 13472
Endogeneity Test Statistics 3.72 4.71 2.32
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial assets. Standard errors are in parentheses.
All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.13: Robustness - Non Crisis Sample
(1) (2)
Head Completely Retired 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.004] [0.004]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics No Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 70588 54162
R-square 0.01 0.01
F-Statistics 50.73 36.08
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial assets. Standard errors are
in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant
at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.14: Robustness - Including High Order Terms
(1) (2)
Head Completely Retired 0.009*** 0.010***
[0.004] [0.004]
Head Age 0.066 0.274
[0.282] [0.330]
Head Age2 -0.002 -0.007
[0.007] [0.008]
Head Age3 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Head Age4 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
ln(Household Income+1) 0.034*** 0.027***
[0.005] [0.006]
ln(Household Income+1)2 0.006*** 0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
ln(Household Wealth+1) 0.048*** 0.055***
[0.002] [0.002]
ln(Household Wealth+1)2 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics No Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 86276 65750
R-squared 0.03 0.03
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial asset. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level,
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.15: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
I(Age of Head ≥ 62) 0.004
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 63) 0.006
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 64) 0.005
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 65) 0.010**
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 66) 0.006
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 67) 0.004
[0.004]
I(Age of Head ≥ 68) 0.002
[0.005]
I(Age of Head ≥ 69) -0.002
[0.005]
I(Age of Head ≥ 70) -0.008
[0.005]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65750 65750 65750 65750 65750 65750 65750 65750 65750
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
F-Statistics 46.59 46.66 46.54 46.67 46.48 46.41 46.39 46.44 46.53
Notes: The dependent variable is the stock share in financial asset. Standard errors are in parentheses. All
standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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CHAPTER III
Cash-out Refinancing as a Tool for Portfolio
Rebalancing
3.1 Introduction
During the housing market boom in early 2000s, U.S. households experienced a significant
appreciation in their home value and a remarkable drop in mortgage interest rate at the same
time (Figure 3.1). Because of the increased home value and low interest rates, homeowners
had a great incentive to refinance their mortgages and pull out some portion of their home
equity during this period. As shown in Figure 3.2, the mortgage refinancing increased dra-
matically since 2001, and the total amount of refinanced mortgage was almost twice as much
as the amount of new origination. In particular, a significant amount of money has been
cashed out from home equity through mortgage refinancing during this period (Figure 3.3).
Total home equity cashed out has dramatically increased from 2001 and reached its peak at
2006, right before the mortgage crisis. This huge amount of money from cashed-out home
equity would have been transferred to consumption or any other types of assets including
risky and risk-free assets. The usage of this cashed-out home equity is important in under-
standing household saving and investment decision and macroeconomic dynamics during this
period. In this paper, I examine how households used this cashed-out home equity during
2000s with a particular focus on asset reallocation.
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For many homeowners, the housing asset accounts for the largest portion of their total
assets, and therefore, variations in house value can significantly affect household consumption
as well as saving and investment decision. In the literature, the effect of housing asset on
consumption has been examined from various perspectives. The wealth effect caused by an
appreciation in house value increases household consumption (Case et al., 2005; Campbell and
Cocco, 2007; Bostic et al., 2009; Carroll et al., 2011). Additionally, change in house value has
effect on household borrowing constraint, which results in change in consumption (Cooper ,
2009, 2013). The effect of housing asset on household saving and investment decision also
has been examined in many studies. A large investment in housing asset can crowd out the
opportunity in investment in other assets. Household portfolio choice can also be affected by
homeownership status, the share of housing asset, and mortgage debt (Flavin and Yamashita,
2002; Cocco, 2005; Yao and Zhang , 2005; Chetty and Szeidl , 2010). These studies conclude
that housing assets affect household consumption and saving decision directly or indirectly.
The effect of cash-out refinancing on household consumption and savings is more direct
and immediate because households actively and voluntarily engage in the transaction. Pre-
vious studies have focused on the direct effect of cash-out refinancing on consumption. Hurst
and Stafford (2004) show that liquidity-constrained homeowners use their home equity to
smooth their consumption by refinancing their mortgages. Their perspective is supported by
the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), showing how an unemployment
shock is related to the propensity to refinance and reduce home equity, controlling for other
variables such as household income, demographics, and the present value of financial gain to
refinance. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2013) use macro level data to describe the rela-
tionship between cash-out refinancing and consumption smoothing motive at the aggregate
level. They conclude that the portion of households that increase their mortgage balance
as they refinance is related to macro variables including interest rate, industrial production,
and income growth. However, considering the dramatic increase in the amount of home
equity cashed out during the housing market boom in the early 2000s, it is likely that the
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cashed-out money was transferred to other asset accounts besides consumption.
In this paper, I examine how households use the funds from cash-out refinancing based on
household level micro data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I particularly
focus on cash-out refinancing behavior of financially unconstrained households. During the
housing market boom and burst in 2000’s, these households cashed out a large amount of
money relative to their income and wealth. These households, although they pulled out a
large amount of home equity, were not likely to increase their consumption, and less probable
to invest in stocks and IRA accounts. Instead, they used the cashed-out home equity to
invest in other real estate such as second home and rental properties, and improved their
main residence. In other words, the financially unconstrained households cashed out home
equity and used this fund to invest aggressively in real estate market, increasing the portion
of real estate in their total wealth.
Cash-out refinancing is an important tool for households to adjust the share of home
equity in total wealth. The mortgage gives homeowners a chance to adjust home equity not
only at the time of home purchase, but also throughout the period of home ownership. The
house is differentiated from other assets because of its role as a residential unit. Homeowners
can enjoy the benefit of living in that dwelling and investing in it at the same time. On the
other hand, unlike other assets, homes cannot be divided so that homeowners cannot easily
realize a gain when their house price rises. Homeowners face only two choices: sell the home
or keep the home. Therefore, realizing a gain implies that they need to find another place
to live, which involves relatively large transaction costs such as taxes, realtor fees, and the
cost of relocating. Even though homeowners cannot easily sell or buy their houses due to
various frictions, they instead use mortgage refinancing to adjust the portion of the housing
asset in their total portfolio. While many have studied the role of mortgage in facilitating
home ownership, few have explored the potential of mortgages to act as a tool for controlling
home equity levels in what, for most people, is their greatest asset. As house prices rise
dramatically during housing market boom, housing assets are likely to take more portion in
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households’ total wealth. In that case, households can increase a mortgage balance so as to
decrease the portion of home equity in total wealth. In other words, the cash-out refinancing
can be used as the tool for rebalancing home equity share in total assets.
Using the PSID data, this paper finds that during the housing market boom, cashed-
out households more actively reduced the home equity share responding to passive increase
in home equity share. However, an investment in other real estate increased the share
of real estate in total wealth, which offsets the rebalancing effect of cash-out refinancing.
Investing in other real estate using cased-out home equity makes households enjoy a greater
leverage effect on real estate investment, but vulnerable to the shock in real estate market.
That is, the cash-out refinancing did not effectively reduce the exposure to housing market
risk and rather encouraged speculative households to invest more aggressively in housing
market. Therefore, cashed-out households that invested in other real estate experienced a
greater appreciation in the value of total wealth during the housing market boom, while they
suffered more from the drop in asset value during the financial crisis.
Much research has been done on the effect of housing asset on households saving and
investment decision (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Cocco, 2005; Yao and Zhang , 2005; Chetty
and Szeidl , 2010). However, most of the previous studies focus on how households adjust
the stock share in the presence of housing assets, while the possibility that households can
adjust their home equity share by changing the leverage in housing investment are over-
looked. This paper focuses on the role of cash-out refinancing as a tool for adjusting home
equity share. Calvet et al. (2009) examine households’ portfolio rebalancing behavior using
detailed Swedish data. They show that households negatively respond to passive stock share
change to restore the previous stock share. However, they only consider the stock share in
financial asset. This paper extends the concept of portfolio rebalancing to home equity share
rebalancing. Cashed-out households negatively respond to the passive increase in home eq-
uity share. However, due to the increase in other real estate share, the rebalancing effect is
offset, while the leverage effect is magnified. By examining the active rebalancing behavior
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in real estate investment, this paper contributes to heighten our understanding in the effect
of housing investment and mortgage on household finance and macroeconomics dynamics,
especially during the housing market boom and burst in 2000’s.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data that are used for analysis
in detail. In section 3, I summarize the cash-out refinancing statistics in 2000’s. Section 4
examines the usage of cashed-out home equity. In section 5, I examine how households rebal-
ance their home equity share using cash-out refinancing. Section 6 provides the discussion
of this paper and section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Data Description
In this paper, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1999 to 2011 to
examine households’ cash-out refinancing behavior. During this period, the PSID surveyed
more than 8,000 households every two years, and collected a wide range of data including
assets, income, expenditure, and household demographic information. Particularly, the PSID
provides detailed information on housing assets and mortgages such as current value of house,
original and remaining mortgage balance, mortgage interest and payment, and refinancing
status.
I choose the period between 2001 and 2011 because 1) housing market experienced large
bubble and burst during this period, 2) mortgage origination and refinancing increased dra-
matically, along with the expansion of mortgage market, and 3) total home equity cashed
out increased considerably since 2001. An additional advantage using the PSID data during
this period is that the PSID began to produce biennial and relatively well-balanced panel
data, which more thoroughly detailed expenditures. The panel characteristic of the PSID is
crucial to this study since most analyses in this study use the change of individual house-
hold characteristics, which can be estimated by comparing data of each household in two
consecutive surveys.1
1For example, the amount of increased mortgage debt can be calculated by subtracting previous mortgage
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As the focus of this paper is on the variation of households’ characteristics, only house-
holds that participated in two consecutive surveys are included in the sample. Among this
sample, I exclude households that rent their main residence unit. These households are ex-
cluded since the major concern in this study is the usage of home equity through mortgage
borrowing. After this selection criteria, I obtain 27,977 sample.2 In the following subsections,
I describe the main items that are employed in the analysis in detail.
The value reported in this paper is nominal. Because the PSID does not report the exact
date (or year) of each transaction between surveys, it is not possible to accurately estimate
an inflation adjusted value of each transaction. For example, an active stock investment
reported in 2009 survey can occur right after 2007 survey, or right before 2009 survey, or
during 2008. Because active investments are important in this paper, I use nominal values
instead of inflation adjusted value.
3.2.1 Key Variables
Assets
The PSID contains several household asset items including house, various financial assets,
and retirement accounts. In the PSID, the total households wealth is defined as follows.
TotalWealth = HomeEquity + Fam/Business+ Checking/Saving + Stock
+OtherAssets+ V ehicles+ Annuities+OtherRealEstate−Debt
Additionally, in this paper, total financial asset is defined as follows.
TotalF inancialAsset = Checking/Savings+ Stock +Bonds−Debt
balance from current balance. Using this mortgage balance change and moving status, I can identify whether
households cashed out their home equity between two survey periods.
2Since this paper uses sample from surveys from 2001 to 2011, 4,666 household samples are observed in
every survey year on average, although there is a variation in sample size over years. For example, in 2001,
the sample size is at lowest, 4,406, while in 2007, it is at highest, 4,767.
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Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of household total wealth and financial wealth by
survey year. The average value of total wealth increased by 55 percent from 2001 to 2007,
but decreased by 15 percent from 2007 to 2011. On the other hand, the average total financial
wealth increased only by 17 percent from 2001 to 2007, and decreased by 12 percent from
2007 to 2011. In other words, the financial wealth is relatively stable during this period,
while the total wealth, which includes home equity and other real estate, is more volatile.
Mortgage
The PSID provides detailed mortgage data, including monthly mortgage payments, remain-
ing mortgage balances, contract years, mortgage rates, and whether a mortgage was refi-
nanced or newly originated. Total amount of mortgage balance is the sum of 1st mortgage
and 2nd mortgage. The concept of the mortgage is comprehensive in the PSID. All types of
loans that use a house as collateral are considered as a mortgage. Because the PSID is a well
balanced panel data, the change in mortgage balance of each household can easily be traced,
which in turn allows us to determine whether there has been a cash-out. However, the data
on mortgages or loans for a second home or other real estate is not provided in the PSID.
Table 3.1 shows that the average mortgage balance is 60,034 dollar in 2001 and 86,150 in
2007. During this period, the average balance increased by 44 percent. Interestingly, even
after mortgage market crisis in 2007, the average mortgage balance increased to 87,464 in
2011.
Income
I use total household income to analyze the effect of income on household consumption and
investment decisions. The PSID provides detailed income data for each household, including
wage, transfer income, and social security income. Not included in the data are the gains
from selling assets such as houses, vehicles, stocks, and bonds. As can be seen in Table 3.1,
an average household’s total income increased constantly from 2003 to 2009 with average
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growth rate 7.5 percent. However, an average income decreased by 3.7 percent from 2009 to
2011.
Expenditure
Historically, the PSID has gathered information about food consumption and housing ex-
penditures. In 1999, the survey began to include more questions regarding household ex-
penditures such as food consumption, transportation expense, utility expense, education,
health spending, and mortgage and loan payments. According to Li et al. (2010), this new,
more detailed expenditure data covers more than 70 percent of expenditures reported in
the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The richness of the expenditure data is important for
my analysis since, in the literature, the consumption smoothing is considered as one of the
most important motive for the cash-out. I compile total expenditure data for each household
to examine the consumption smoothing motive of cash-out refinancing. However, housing
expenditures such as mortgage payments and property tax payments are excluded as those
expenditures are directly related to mortgage balance. Table 3.1 shows that an average non-
durable good consumption increased rapidly from 2001 to 2007. Households reduce their
expenditure after 2007 although the average (and median) income did not decrease during
this period.
Demographic Information
In addition to various financial information, I also use the demographic information on each
household, including the age of head, year of education, marital status, and family compo-
sition. Because these factors affect households’ financial decision, I use these demographic
information as control variables in the most of the analysis.
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3.3 Cash-out Refinancing in 2000’s
In this section, I summarize the general characteristics of cash-out refinancing during the
housing market boom and burst in 2000’s. Additionally, I examine what triggered cash-out
refinancing during this period.
3.3.1 Definition of Cash-out Refinancing
Cash-out refinancing refers to a mortgage refinance transaction in which the homeowner
increases the mortgage balance so that the new balance is greater than the previous mortgage
balance plus closing costs. In their report of cash-out refinance share, Freddie Mac defines
cash-out refinance as “the refinancing of a mortgage with at least a 5% greater loan amount
than the previous unpaid mortgage balance.” On the other hand, Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae’s credit policy guidelines for lenders define a cash-out refinance loan as “one that is
either used to extract home equity (that is, the borrower receives a cash payment from the
refinance settlement) or is used to pay off an existing second lien (for example, a home equity
line of credit or home equity loan) that was not used in the purchase of the home.” Because
the PSID asks no direct question about cash-out refinancing and does not collect information
about the purchase of a new main residence, cash-out refinancing transactions are difficult to
identify. To overcome this problem, I use other information in the PSID such as move-in year,
ownership status and change in mortgage balance. Move-in year and ownership status are
important to distinguish the cash-out refinancing from the mortgage balance change caused
by new home purchase. In this paper, the cash-out mortgage refinancing is defined as an
increase in mortgage balance without a move into a new home between two survey periods.
Given this perspective, the concept of cash-out refinancing is more comprehensive in this
paper. For example, I consider the origination of a new home equity loan, which results in
a total mortgage balance increase, as a cash-out refinancing, even though a household has
not refinanced their first mortgage.
107
3.3.2 Cash-out Refinancing Statistics
I summarize cash-out refinancing statistics in the PSID from 2001 to 2011 in Table 3.2. Part I
in Table 3.2 shows the percentage of cashed-out households among homeowners and mortgage
holders. The percentage of cashed-out households among homeowners was at lowest, 22.1
percent in 2011, and at highest, 29.3 percent in 2003. This percentage reached 39.7 percent
when the sample was restricted to homeowners with a positive mortgage balance. To check
whether the cash-out refinancing prevails only among financially constrained household, I
divide sample into two groups: households with financial assets less than 10,000 dollars and
more than 10,000 dollars, and calculate the portion of cashed-out households by the two
groups. Throughout all survey years, the portion of cashed-out households with less than
10,000 dollars was higher than with more than 10,000 dollars. However, the relatively large
number of households with financial assets more than 10,000 dollars also cashed out during
this period. On average, more than 30 percent of mortgage holders that had more than
10,000 dollars in their financial assets cashed out during this period.
I also estimate the amount of cashed-out home equity during this period. The average
amount of cashed-out home equity increased from $24,635 in 2001 to $40,482 in 2007. This
amount varies with the financial status of households. Overall, households that held more
than 10,000 dollars in financial assets pulled out the larger amount of money from their home
equity. For example, in 2007, households with more than 10,000 dollars in their financial
assets cashed out 49,544 dollars on average, while 36,195 dollars were cashed out from home
equity of households with less than 10,000 dollars in their financial assets. These statistics
show that the cash-out refinancing was relatively widespread during this period regardless
of household financial status, and the amount of cash-out was not negligible.
Portion of Home Equity Cashed-out
For the better understanding of the relative magnitude of cashed-out home equity in house-
hold accounts, I summarize the portion of home equity cashed out in various household
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accounts in Table 3.3. The amount of cashed-out home equity takes about 17 percent of
total house value on average with a large variation across years. The cashed-out home equity
takes more than 45 percent of total household income on average, and in 2007 survey, the
amount takes the largest portion compared to household total income, 51.7 percent. I also
compare the amount of cashed-out home equity with total nondurable consumption. The
cashed-out amount takes more than twice of total nondurable consumption on average. From
the estimated result in this table, we understand that the amount of home equity cashed-out
takes non-negligible portion in household total wealth, income, and consumption. There-
fore, the cashed-out home equity may affect not only consumption but also household asset
composition.
Loan-to-value (LTV) Ratio
Cash-out refinancing, which increases mortgage balance, results in the change in the LTV
ratio. Most homeowners expect decreasing LTV ratio over time because monthly mortgage
payment reduces the mortgage balance gradually and nominal value of house usually in-
creases in the long run. On the other hand, the LTV ratio can increase when households
increase mortgage balance through refinancing and house prices decrease. The LTV ratio
is a key factor when we consider the effect of housing asset on household financial decision.
For example, the LTV ratio affects household consumption through borrowing constraint
channel (Cooper , 2013), and is also closely related to the mortgage default decision (Elul
et al., 2010). Figure 3.4 plots the LTV ratio throughout survey years by cash-out refinancing
status. As the figure shows, the LTV ratio has fluctuated over time. The LTV ratio tends
to be high during recession, while it decreases during booming periods. The LTV ratio also
varies with the cash-out status. The LTV ratio of households that cashed out home equity
was higher than the ratio of households that did not cash out. The difference in LTV ratio
between cashed-out and non cashed-out households was 2 to 5 percents. I also calculate the
change in the LTV ratio between two survey periods, which is described in Figure 3.5. As
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expected, after cashing out home equity, the LTV ratio increased, while households that did
not cash out home equity experienced a decrease in the LTV ratio. After the cash-out, the
LTV ratio increased by 5 to 15 percent on average. Considering that housing assets take a
large portion in household total wealth, 5 to 15 percent increase in LTV ratio can have a
significant effect on household asset composition.
3.3.3 Determinants of Cash-out
Cash-out refinancing decision can be affected by various factors including the house price
growth rate, the difference between original mortgage rates and current market rates, the
LTV ratio, the remaining mortgage period, income, and wealth. I examine what triggers
household cash-out refinancing decision among these factors. To this end, I run the Probit
regression with cash-out refinancing status as a dependent variable. Table 3.4 shows the
result of the Probit regression. Based on the assumption that households with a different level
of financial assets have a different motivation in cash-out, I report the result for households
with financial asset less than 10,000 dollars and more than 10,000 dollars separately. As
column (1) and (2) in Table 3.4 shows, for both financially constrained and unconstrained
households, most of the factors listed in the table have significant effects on the cash-out
refinancing decision. However, the income growth rates do not significantly affect the cash-
out refinancing decision for both financially constrained and unconstrained households. One
difference between financially constrained and unconstrained groups is that the existence in
other debt only significantly affects cash-out refinancing decision for financially unconstrained
households.
To understand the effect of each factor listed above on cash-out refinancing decision
more precisely, I estimate the marginal effect of each explanatory variable. The LTV ratio
affects the cash-out decision more significantly for financially constrained households. For
example, when the LTV ratio decreases from 0.8 to 0.6, financially constrained households
are about 9 percent more likely to cash out, while financially unconstrained households are
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5.2 percent more likely to cash out. The mortgage rate for the first loan affects the cash-out
decision more significantly for financially unconstrained households. Increasing the difference
between the original rate and the current rate from 1 to 2 percent, financially constrained
households are 1.5 percent more likely to cash out, while financially unconstrained households
are 2.3 percent more likely to cash out. Interestingly, previous home equity share is another
important determinant of cash-out refinancing. For example, when the previous home equity
share increases from 0.5 to 0.8, the likelihood of cashing out increases by 1.1 percent and
2.5 percent for financially constrained and unconstrained households, respectively. That is,
households consider the portion of home equity in total wealth when they decide to cash
out. The existence of 2nd mortgage is another concern when households decide to cash
out. However, the 2nd mortgage rate does not significantly affect the cash-out decision for
both groups as column (4) and (5) show. Overall, various factors affect household cash-out
refinancing decision, while financially constrained and unconstrained households respond
differently to each factor.
3.4 Usage of Cashed-out Home Equity
According to the recent cash-out refinance report by Freddie Mac, the total cashed-out
home equity in 2006, right before financial crisis, was $320 billion, which was more than
10 times greater than the amount in 2000. Examining the usage of this large amount of
cashed-out home equity is crucial for understanding economic phenomena during the housing
market boom and burst. In this section, I examine where this cashed-out home equity was
used, particularly focusing on cash-out refinancing behavior of financially unconstrained
households.3
3In this section, I define the financially unconstrained households as households with financial assets more
than 10,000 dollars.
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Likelihood of Increasing in Consumption
Cash-out refinancing accompanies real money transaction, and this money should be con-
sumed or go into one of their asset accounts. I first test whether financially unconstrained
households use the cashed-out home equity to increase consumption level. To this end, I cre-
ate the indicating variables whether households increase consumption more than 10 percent
and 20 percent compared to previous survey year, and use these indicators to run Probit
regression to examine the probability of increasing in consumption is related to cash-out
refinancing. Column (1) and (2) in Table 3.5 report the results of Probit regression. As can
been seen, the cash-out event has no significant relationship with an increase in consump-
tion, while other factors including change in income level and age are closely related to an
increase in consumption level.
Likelihood of Investing in Other Assets
Households should put their cashed-out home equity into one of their asset accounts unless
they consume all of the additional borrowing. Using Probit regressions, I examine which
accounts households are more likely to invest in. I generate dummy variables which indicate
whether net investment in a specific asset is positive. The PSID asks detailed questions
regarding their investment activity. For instance, questions regarding stock investment are
as follows.
“Did you buy more or sell more–that is, on balance, did you put money into stocks,
mutual funds, or investment trusts, take money out of them, or put about as much in as you
took out?”
“About how much did you (or anyone in your family living there) put in or take out?”
Using these specific questions on the investment in each asset account, I estimate whether
the net investment in each asset is negative or positive. Using these estimated variables, I
run Probit regressions to find that the cashed-out households are more probable to invest
in specific accounts including stock, IRA, and other real estate. Column (3)-(5) in Table
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3.5 describe the result of Probit regressions. The cash-out event reduces the probability of
investing in stock and IRA accounts with statistically significances at 0.5% and 0.1% level,
respectively. The probability of investing in other real estate, on the other hand, increases
when households cash-out their home equity. Additionally, Column (6) shows that cashed-
out households are more likely to use the money to repair their home. That is, households
pull out home equity and reinvest in home, which increases the value of house. In sum,
households that cashed-out home equity are less likely to invest in stocks or IRA accounts,
but they are more likely to reinvest in their house and/or invest in other real estate. To
investigate the usage of cash-out home equity in more detail, I examine the relationship
between the amount of cashed-out home equity and net investment in stocks, IRA accounts,
other real estate, and home repairs.
Cashed-out Home Equity and Net Investment in Other Assets
The amount of cashed-out home equity is related to the amount of net investment in a certain
asset if households use the cashed-out home equity to invest in other assets. To study the
relationship between net investment and the amount of cashed-out home equity, I run the
following regression model for cashed-out households.
NIOtherAssets,t = β0 + β1AmountCashedOutt + β2Zt + t (3.1)
where NIOtherAssets is a net investment in other assets, AmountCashedOut is a total amount
of cashed-out home equity, and Z is a set of other control variables. Table 3.6 shows the
result of the regressions for stock, IRA, other real estate, and home repair. Column (1)
shows that the net investment in stock is negatively related to the amount of cashed-out
home equity. As households pull out larger amount of money from home equity, the net
investment in stock is reduced. On the other hand, there is no significant relationship
between the net investment in IRA and the cashed-out amount. Other real estate investment
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and home repair expense are positively and statistically significantly related to the amount
of cashed-out home equity, which is consistent with the result of Probit regression above.
More specifically, since households that cashed-out and invested in other real estate pulled
out $71,728 from home equity on average from 2001 to 2007, $32,421 dollars were invested
in other real estate. If we assume that the LTV ratio for other real estate investment is
75 percent, cashed-out households can invest in other real estates with total value 130,000
dollars approximately.4 As households invest in other real estate using cashed-out home
equity, households take a greater leverage position in real estate market, which makes their
portfolio performance more responsive to house price fluctuations.
Home Equity Share and Real Estate Share after Cashing-out
The previous results show that cashed-out households are more probable to invest in other
real estate and the amount of cashed-out home equity is related to the net investment in other
real estate. In addition, I examine whether the investment behavior of cashed-out households
affects the asset composition so that the exposure to housing market risk changes through
cash-out refinancing. I first estimate the participation rate in other real estate investment
and the share of other real estate in total wealth by cash-out status. Figure 3.6 shows that
the share of other real estate for cashed-out households increases rapidly compared to non
cashed-out households before 2007, while there is no certain pattern in the participation
rate. This figure is consistent with the result of the previous analysis, that is, cashed-out
households use their home equity to invest more aggressively in real estate market.5
4The PSID does not provide the LTV ratio for other real estate investment. I, instead, use the average
LTV ratio from 2001 to 2007 based on the conventional single family mortgage data from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency.
5Since Figure 3.6 shows the simple difference in average real estate share between cashed-out and non-
cashed out households for every survey year, I cannot track the long-term effect of cash-out refinancing, and
there could be a selection bias issue. In the following section, I focus on individual level variations to control
for individual level characteristics.
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3.5 Cash-out Refinancing and Home Equity Rebalancing
Cash-out refinancing affects household asset composition. First of all, households can reduce
the share of home equity in total wealth as they increase the debt against house. Secondly,
the cashed-out home equity can increase the share of other assets in total wealth if households
use the cashed-out money to save or invest in other assets. In this section, I examine how
households rebalance their portfolio including home equity through cash-out refinancing.
3.5.1 Change in Home Equity Share
The portion of home equity in total household wealth varies across time because of variation
in house value, mortgage balance, and non-housing wealth. Table 3.7.A shows the change
in home equity share in total wealth over the survey periods. As can be seen, throughout
the survey period, home equity share was decreasing, while home equity share decreased
more rapidly after the financial crisis in 2008. Home equity share was decreasing over time
even during the housing market boom because most homeowners held mortgages against
their home and paid off the mortgage balance gradually and the portion of other assets in
total wealth increased over time as homeowners kept saving and investing in other asset.
The change in home equity share is also summarized by cash-out status in Table 3.7.A. The
change in home equity share has a negative value for both cashed-out and non cashed-out
households. However, the magnitude is significantly higher for cashed-out homeowners. It
is because the home equity share decreases more rapidly as homeowners increase mortgage
balance through cash-out refinancing.
Passive and Active Change in Home Equity Share
A change in home equity share is composed of passive and active changes. The fluctuation
in house price causes passive change in home equity share, while households change their
home equity share actively by adjusting mortgage balance and increasing (or decreasing)
other asset accounts. By decomposing active and passive changes in home equity share, we
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can understand how households actively respond to passive change in home equity share. I
decompose the passive and active change in home equity share using current and previous
self-reported house value, mortgage balance, and non-housing wealth. The passive (θPH,t) and
active (θAH,t) change in home equity share are defined as follows.
6
∆θPH,t = θ
P
H,t − θH,t−1
∆θAH,t = θH,t − θPH,t
where θH,t and θH,t−1 are the home equity share in total wealth at t and t− 1, respectively.
θPH,t is the passive home equity share, which is estimated as follows.
θPH,t =
PtHt −Mortgaget−1 −Repairt
PtHt −Mortgaget−1 −Repairt +W Pt−1
where Pt is a house price per unit at t, Ht is number of unit invested in house at t,
Mortgaget−1 is a total mortgage at t − 1, Repairt is a repair expense on house between
t and t − 1, and W Pt−1 is the value of total non-housing wealth at t − 1. Since current
mortgage balance reflects homeowner’s active response to house price change, the previous
mortgage balance is used for calculating passive home equity share. Additionally, the home
repair expense is subtracted because the home repair can significantly increase the value of
house, which is considered as an active investment on the house. Therefore, passive home
equity share only captures the change in home equity share caused by the change in value
of house.
Using this definition, I estimate the passive and active change in home equity share for
each survey year as in Table 3.7.B and Table 3.7.C. The passive change in home equity share
was positive from 2001 to 2007, but turned into negative after 2009. There was a significant
6When I estimate the passive and active change in home equity share, I confine sample to households
which do not move and resize their home in order to concentrate on the role of mortgage refinancing in
portfolio rebalancing.
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difference in the passive share change between cashed-out and non cashed-out households.
For example, the passive change in home equity share of cashed-out households in 2007 was
0.053, which is more than twice of the passive change of non cashed-out households, 0.025.
This pattern explains that cashed-out households experienced more appreciation in house
value so that they had more incentive to pull out the home equity during the housing market
boom. Based on this basic finding regarding the passive and active change in home equity
share, I examine home equity rebalancing behavior in detail below.
3.5.2 Home Equity Share Rebalancing
Every household has their own optimal portfolio choice based on their risk preference and
socio-economic condition such as income, wealth, age, and family composition. Because as-
set price fluctuates frequently, households should rebalance their portfolio to maintain the
optimal share of each asset. Calvet et al. (2009) study portfolio rebalancing behavior using
Swedish data and show that households negatively response to passive change in stock share.
In other words, households tend to restore their previous optimal position as they actively
adjust their risky share. However, this study only considers the rebalancing of stock share
in financial asset, as most studies regarding optimal portfolio share usually do. The role of
house in household’s portfolio should not be underestimated since house, on average, takes
the largest portion in homeowner’s total asset, even after subtracting mortgage debt. Partic-
ularly, during the housing market boom and burst in 2000’s, the portfolio share of each asset
can be significantly affected by house price fluctuation. Several papers examine the effect of
home equity on portfolio choice. In general, these studies conclude that a homeownership
or an investment in housing asset reduces a stock share due to a substitution effect. This
substitution effect results from the fact that households consider a house as a risky asset.
Therefore, homeowners are expected to respond to house price change as well as stock price
change in order to maintain their optimal portfolio share. However, households are more
likely to be passive regarding home equity share change because resizing house involves large
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transaction costs including realtor fee, taxes, and moving expense. Additionally, because a
house directly affects households’ utility as durable goods consumption, the resizing deci-
sion is more complicated than any other investment. Consequently, household is reluctant
to adjust their home equity share actively in the presence of various frictions. However,
as mortgage markets grow remarkably, households can change home equity share actively
without change their house size. The net equity on housing asset is determined by house
value subtracted by mortgage debt. Households reduce home equity share as they borrow
mortgage more against a house while paying monthly mortgage bill increases home equity
share. That is, households can rebalance their home equity share more aggressively as they
cash-out from their home equity.
Following the methodology in Calvet et al. (2009), I examine how households actively
adjust home equity share especially using the cash-out refinancing. Particularly, I use the
following rebalancing regression as Calvet et al. (2009) use to examine the stock share rebal-
ancing behavior.
∆θAH,t = β0 + β1∆θ
P
H,t + β2(θH,t−1 − θH,t−1) + t
where θAH,t and θ
P
H,t are the active and passive change in home equity share between t and
t − 1, θH,t−1 is the home equity share at t − 1, and θH,t−1 is the average home equity share
at t− 1. The regression coefficient β1 shows how actively homeowner rebalance their home
equity share responding to passive home equity share change. I run this regression before
2007 and after 2007 separately, and report the results in the first two columns in Table 3.8.
The coefficient on the the passive home equity change in the column (1) is -0.601, which
means that households, whose average passive home equity change is 0.032, reduce their
home equity actively by 0.019 before 2007. After 2007, households, whose average passive
home equity share change is -0.036, increase their home equity actively by 0.029. Column
(3) to (6) in Table 3.8 report the result of the regression for cashed-out and non-cashed-out
households separately. As shown in the table, before 2007, the cashed-out households respond
more aggressively to the passive change in home equity share. Cashed-out households, whose
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average passive home equity share change is 0.049, reduce home equity shares by 0.031, while
non cashed-out households, whose average is 0.027, reduce the home equity share by 0.015.
On the other hand, after 2007, non cashed-out households respond more aggressively to a
decrease in passive home equity share. The passive changes in home equity shares for cashed-
out and non cashed-out households are -0.043 and -0.034 on average after 2007. Therefore,
they reduce home equity share by 0.025 and 0.030, respectively, on average. As home equity
share increases rapidly during the booming housing market, households tend to reduce their
home equity share actively. This rebalancing behavior appears more strongly among cashed-
out households, whose average home equity increases more than the average of non cash-out
households. That is, they reduce home equity share more aggressively responding to an
increase in home equity share through cash-out refinancing.
3.5.3 Real Estate Share Rebalancing
Households are exposed to housing market risk as they own home and invest in other real
estate. Even though homeowners’ total wealth increases during housing market boom, due
to the role of housing asset as durable goods, it is difficult to enjoy real gain from housing
investment unless they reduce the size of their main residence. Instead, households, which
expect high return on housing market, can purchase other real estate such as second home and
rental properties to earn realizable gain from real estate investment. In that case, households
are exposed to an additional real estate market risk. To examine households’ real exposure
to real estate market, I introduce a real estate share, which is the sum of home equity share
and other real estate share. In the previous section, I find that households that cash out their
home equity are more likely to invest in other real estate. This investment increases a real
estate share, while the cash-out reduces it. The home equity rebalancing regression above
shows that cashed-out households reduce home equity share more aggressively. However, it
is unclear whether households reduce the real exposure to real estate market as they cash-
out because they can invest in other real estate using cashed-out home equity. I run a real
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estate share rebalancing regression to find how households actively change a real estate share
responding to the passive change in real estate share. To this end, I first define passive real
estate share as follows.
θPR,t =
PtHt −Mortgaget−1 −Repairt +RealEstt −NIRealEst,t
PtHt −Mortgaget−1 −Repairt−1 +RealEstt −NIRealEst,t +W PNonRealEst,t−1
where RealEstt is a net value of other real estate at t, NIRealEst,t is a net investment in
other real estate between t and t−1, and W PNonRealEst,t−1 is the value of total non-real estate
wealth at t−1, and definitions for other variables are the same as for the passive home equity
share. Since the PSID only provides the net value of other real estate, I cannot distinguish
the effect of mortgage balance change from asset value change for other real estate. Instead,
I use the amount of net investment in other real estate to rule out the effect of active change.
Definitions of the passive real estate change (∆θPR,t) and the active real estate change (∆θ
A
R,t)
are similar as for home equity.
Using these passive and active real estate change, I run the real estate share rebalancing
regression as follows.
∆θAR,t = β0 + β1∆θ
P
R,t + β2(θR,t−1 − θR,t−1) + t
where ∆θAR,t and ∆θ
P
R,t are the active and passive change in real estate share between t and
t − 1, θR,t−1 is the real estate share at t − 1, and θR,t−1 is the average real estate share
at t − 1. Table 3.9 shows the result of the regression. Column (1) and (2) show that the
coefficients on the passive real estate change before and after 2007 are both negative, -0.440
and -0.393, respectively. Since the average passive change in real estate share before and
after 2007 were 0.010 and -0.079, households reduced real estate share by 0.004 before 2007,
but increased the share by 0.031 after 2007. The difference in real estate share rebalancing
behavior between cashed-out and non cashed-out households is reported in Column (3)-
(6). Interestingly, there is no significant difference in coefficients on passive real estate
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change between cashed-out and non cashed-out households, which is distinguished from the
result of home equity share rebalancing regression in the previous section. Non cashed-out
households, whose passive real estate share is increased by 0.038 on average, reduce 66.7
percent of the increase. Cashed-out households, which reduce their home equity share more
aggressively, respond less actively to real estate share change. On average, the real estate
share of cash-out households is increased by 0.044 and they actively reduce the share by
0.021. This result supports the idea that cashed-out households use their home equity to
invest in other real estate. Cashed-out households seem to decrease their home equity more
aggressively, however, because of increasing in other real estate share, their exposure to real
estate market is not reduced in fact. After all, this real estate rebalancing behavior makes
cashed-out households exposed more in housing market risk compared to the non cashed-out
households.
3.6 Discussion
This paper provides evidence that the cashed-out home equity, which dramatically increased
during the housing market boom in 2000’s, was partly used for investing in other real es-
tate.7. Cash-out refinancing makes households enable to decrease the home equity share, but
increase the leverage ratio at the same time. Households enjoy greater leverage effect on real
estate investment by investing in other real estate using cashed-out home equity. However,
the increased leverage position to real estate market makes households vulnerable to housing
market risk. Table 3.10 compares the average returns on total wealth by cash-out and other
real estate investment status before and after the financial crisis. Before the financial crisis,
households that cashed-out and invested in other real estate experienced the greatest appre-
ciation in their total wealth. However, after the financial crisis, their total wealth decreased
7Since the analysis of this paper is based on survey data, the aggregate effect of cash-out refinancing
cannot be estimated precisely. However, owing to the national representativeness of sample in the PSID
data, the finding in this paper helps us understand the effect of cash-out refinancing on our aggregate
economy.
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the most. This summary statistics partially support the idea that households that invested
in other real estate using cashed-out home equity experienced a large appreciation in asset
value, but suffered more when housing market crashed during the financial crisis.
As the literature points out, a variation in leverage and collateral constraints are impor-
tant factors that explain asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics (Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997; Bernanke et al., 1999; Geanakoplos , 2010). Additionally, many studies find evidence
that the excessive credit supply caused by mortgage market expansion is associated with the
rapid increase in house price (Coleman et al., 2008; Wheaton and Nechayev , 2008; Glaeser
et al., 2010; Pavlov and Wachter , 2011; Brueckner et al., 2012). This paper provides evidence
that a dramatic increase in cash-out refinancing was related to an aggressive investment in
real estate market, which is another channel that amplifies the leverage effect. By examining
this relationship further in detail, we can understand the housing market bubble and burst
in 2000’s more precisely.
3.7 Conclusion
For most homeowners, their housing asset accounts for the largest portion of their total
assets. As the mortgage market expands and housing value increases, households have more
opportunities to extract a home equity. Since household consumption and investment deci-
sions are one of the most important influence on our economy, it is important to examine
how households use their home equity. The relation between household consumption and
cash-out refinancing has been examined previously, especially for financially constrained
households. However, the cash-out refinancing motive for financially unconstrained house-
holds was not considered even though the amount they cashed-out were not negligible. I
find that financially unconstrained households also cashed out large amount of home equity
during the housing market boom in early 2000s, and were probable to use their home equity
to increase their investment in other real estate. Households whose share of home equity
in their total assets is lower than other wealthy households have an incentive to participate
122
more in the housing or real estate market to increase an exposure to real estate market.
Before the mortgage market crisis, housing market looked solid as well as profitable. There-
fore, prior to the crisis, increasing the share of real estate seemed reasonable if investment
opportunity existed. However, this over-investment based on expansion of mortgage market
finally resulted in the housing market collapse and households that aggressively invested
in real estate market using their home equity were suffering from decreasing values of the
largest portion of their portfolio.
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Figure 3.1: Mortgage Rates and House Price Index
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Figure 3.2: Total Mortgage Originations
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Figure 3.3: Total Home Equity Cashed-out
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Figure 3.4: Average Loan-to-Value Ratio by Cash-out Status
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Figure 3.5: Difference in Loan-to-Value Ratio by Cash-out Status
-­‐0.10	  
-­‐0.05	  
0.00	  
0.05	  
0.10	  
0.15	  
0.20	  
2001	   2003	   2005	   2007	   2009	   2011	  
Non	  Cash-­‐out	   Cash-­‐out	  
Note: This graph is based on the author’s estimation using the PSID from 1999 to 2011. The LTV
ratio is estimated by dividing total mortgage amount by self-reported house value. Total mortgage
amount includes 1st and 2nd mortgage balance as well as home equity loan.
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Figure 3.6: Other Real Estate Share in Total Wealth
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129
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Year
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Total Wealth
Mean 203,702 212,865 272,027 315,576 275,616 266,892 258,480
S.D. 281,903 298,950 383,782 452,972 431,126 411,961 385,267
Median 96,550 99,500 124,000 143,000 117,000 110,000 114,000
1st Quartile 36,850 37,550 46,100 51,500 38,000 36,200 41,000
3rd Quartile 247,600 259,400 330,750 373,000 322,000 309,400 305,000
Total Non-housing Wealth
Mean 127,000 124,702 154,716 180,856 166,215 165,345 153,473
S.D. 231,057 233,164 296,435 347,273 344,895 331,136 302,800
Median 32,300 32,000 34,501 39,000 34,000 31,100 33,500
1st Quartile 6,500 6,000 6,500 7,400 5,392 5,000 6,000
3rd Quartile 138,500 126,750 159,500 182,500 161,000 160,375 154,000
Total Financial Assets
Mean 43,834 40,711 46,361 51,162 46,402 44,820 45,580
S.D. 106,928 99,477 120,581 132,910 127,485 129,859 120,373
Median 3,000 4,000 3,000 3,500 3,000 2,000 3,000
1st Quartile -500 -600 -1,500 -2,000 -3,500 -4,000 -1,999
3rd Quartile 35,500 36,000 35,000 40,000 40,000 33,000 36,000
House Value
Mean 133,942 155,572 199,212 227,488 206,063 190,342 185,948
S.D. 99,470 120,082 165,975 181,636 154,511 140,195 149,967
Median 110,000 125,000 150,000 175,000 165,000 150,000 145,000
1st Quartile 65,000 75,000 86,000 98,000 100,000 90,000 83,000
3rd Quartile 175,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 270,000 250,000 250,000
Mortgage
Mean 60,034 70,103 78,680 86,150 91,062 87,464 79,030
S.D. 65,647 75,415 83,948 90,969 94,028 93,166 85,274
Median 45,000 52,000 58,900 63,000 69,000 65,000 57,946
1st Quartile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3rd Quartile 94,000 110,000 125,000 140,000 150,000 142,418 125,000
Total Income
Mean 67,304 66,940 72,180 78,501 83,122 80,085 74,800
S.D. 49,577 46,005 50,783 55,903 57,769 55,628 53,193
Median 56,000 56,489 60,930 66,255 71,000 68,050 63,015
1st Quartile 33,000 34,000 36,135 39,000 42,156 39,400 37,000
3rd Quartile 87,700 89,000 94,600 101,532 107,285 105,700 98,031
Total Non-durable Consumption
Mean 13,566 13,920 15,938 17,500 17,200 18,289 16,099
S.D. 7,763 8,023 9,115 9,683 9,674 10,062 9,282
Median 11,827 12,148 13,810 15,434 15,228 16,482 14,080
1st Quartile 8,445 8,536 9,793 10,880 10,585 11,260 9,720
3rd Quartile 16,596 17,240 19,840 21,920 21,400 23,070 20,140
Note: The number is reported in nominal US dollars. All values are winsorized at bottom 1 percent and top
1 percent level.
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Table 3.2: Cashed-out Refinancing Statistics
I. Portion of Cashed-out Households
Year
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Homeowners 0.253 0.293 0.274 0.262 0.257 0.221 0.260
Mortgage Holders 0.345 0.397 0.370 0.356 0.345 0.306 0.354
Homeowners & Financial Asset less than 10,000 0.292 0.314 0.296 0.304 0.287 0.241 0.289
Homeowners & Financial Asset more than 10,000 0.194 0.260 0.241 0.200 0.210 0.187 0.216
Mortgage Holders & Financial Asset less than 10,000 0.371 0.397 0.371 0.383 0.358 0.312 0.365
Mortgage Holders & Financial Asset more than 10,000 0.298 0.398 0.367 0.308 0.322 0.294 0.332
II. Amount of Total Home Equity Cashed-out
Year
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Total
Total Mean 24,635 27,790 35,014 40,482 39,303 30,273 32,996
S.D. 29,866 32,471 47,959 52,330 66,954 45,526 47,645
Obs. 815 1,066 980 928 874 760 5,423
Financial Asset less than 10000 Mean 21,776 25,228 27,462 36,195 33,594 25,418 28,399
S.D. 25,623 28,757 34,499 46,477 55,994 39,628 39,981
Obs. 556 654 610 630 557 496 3,503
Financial Asset more than 10000 Mean 30,772 31,856 47,464 49,544 49,335 39,394 41,385
S.D. 36,694 37,299 62,357 62,057 81,911 53,830 58,205
Obs. 259 412 370 298 317 264 1,920
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Table 3.3: Portion of Cashed-out Home Equity in Assets, Income, and Consumption
Wealth inc. Wealth excl. Financial House Household Non-durable
Year Home Equity Home Equity Asset Income Consumption
2001 Mean 0.442 1.270 2.666 0.205 0.436 1.955
S.D. 0.971 5.494 20.423 0.211 0.539 2.358
Median 0.153 0.250 0.135 0.128 0.248 1.159
2003 Mean 0.354 1.107 1.731 0.170 0.442 2.020
S.D. 0.952 4.148 14.516 0.171 0.556 2.354
Median 0.135 0.238 0.217 0.117 0.252 1.200
2005 Mean 0.349 1.252 1.980 0.163 0.494 2.035
S.D. 0.915 5.073 14.725 0.170 0.631 2.309
Median 0.135 0.271 0.237 0.108 0.267 1.217
2007 Mean 0.353 1.461 2.390 0.170 0.517 2.292
S.D. 0.929 5.955 18.865 0.174 0.615 2.689
Median 0.151 0.318 0.200 0.111 0.304 1.316
2009 Mean 0.273 1.285 3.103 0.154 0.450 2.047
S.D. 0.980 5.054 18.418 0.173 0.614 2.681
Median 0.108 0.213 0.171 0.087 0.215 1.097
2011 Mean 0.190 0.867 2.481 0.132 0.369 2.468
S.D. 0.972 4.246 16.210 0.150 0.537 2.861
Median 0.073 0.156 0.100 0.080 0.183 1.346
Total Mean 0.331 1.213 2.355 0.167 0.455 2.126
S.D. 0.954 5.027 17.180 0.177 0.587 2.541
Median 0.125 0.240 0.181 0.104 0.242 1.221
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Table 3.6: Regression of Net Investments on Mortgage Balance Change
Dependent Var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Investment In Stock IRA Real Estate Home Repair
Amount of Cashed-out Home Equity -0.274* 0.013 0.452*** 0.028**
[0.152] [0.016] [0.145] [0.012]
∆Income (%) -7,913 104 -25,295 -386
[14,930] [1,934] [20,078] [1,293]
Total Income (in $100,000) 672.97 346.20** 1,178.94 98.86
[1,171.34] [161.70] [1,748.47] [111.73]
Total Wealth (in $100,000) -208.13 27.52 703.88*** 14.26
[218.14] [23.92] [246.72] [18.09]
Age -695 1,341*** 6,028 -194
[3,690] [456] [5,189] [324]
Age Squared 8.079 -15.291*** -67.582 0.858
[35.594] [4.291] [50.815] [3.088]
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 42,173 -24,286** -193,375 25,411***
[98,175] [11,861] [130,475] [8,315]
Obs. 94 544 160 368
Rsquared 0.08 0.1 0.23 0.04
Adj Rsquared -0.05 0.08 0.18 0.01
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at
the 10 percent level
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Table 3.10: Aggregate Return on Total Wealth by Cash-out and Real Estate Investment Sta-
tuses
Inv in Real Estate
(2001-2007)
Yes No Total
Aggregate Return on Total Wealth (2001-2007) Cash Out Mean 0.714 0.584 0.614
(2001-2007) S.D. 0.975 1.024 1.015
Not Cash Out Mean 0.620 0.540 0.554
(2001-2007) S.D. 0.967 1.020 1.011
Total Mean 0.673 0.561 0.584
S.D. 0.973 1.022 1.013
Aggregate Return on Total Wealth (2007-2011) Cash Out Mean -0.147 -0.117 -0.124
(2001-2007) S.D. 0.859 0.910 0.898
Not Cash Out Mean -0.134 -0.068 -0.080
(2001-2007) S.D. 0.801 0.871 0.859
Total Mean -0.142 -0.092 -0.102
S.D. 0.834 0.890 0.879
Note: Aggregate return on total wealth is based on the change in self-reported value of total wealth between
2001 and 2007. Cashed-out households indicate households that cashed out at least once between 2001
and 2007. Investment in real estate indicates households that investment in other real estate at least once
between 2001 and 2007.
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APPENDIX A
Solving Maximization Problem
The first order condition with respect to α for the maximization problem is as follows.
E [V ′(Wt+1)(Rs,t+1 −Rf )] = 0 (A.1)
where
V ′(Wt+1) =
(
(1− θ)1−θθθ)1−γW−γt+1P θ(γ−1)t+1 (A.2)
We can rewrite the first-order condition (24) as follows.
E [V ′(Wt+1)(1 +Rs,t+1)] = E [V ′(Wt+1)(1 +Rf )]
E [exp {log V ′(Wt+1) + log(1 +Rs,t+1)}] = E [exp {log V ′(Wt+1) + log(1 +Rf )}]
E [exp {v′(wt+1) + rs,t+1}] = E [exp {v′(wt+1) + rf}] (A.3)
Let xt+1 = v
′(wt+1)+rs,t+1 and yt+1 = v′(wt+1)+rf . Taking a second-order Taylor expansion
around xt+1 = E [xt+1] and yt+1 = E [yt+1] provide the following equation.
exp {E[xt+1]}
(
1 +
1
2
V ar[xt+1]
)
= exp {E[yt+1]}
(
1 +
1
2
V ar[yt+1]
)
(A.4)
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Taking a first-order Taylor expansion around zero
E[xt+1] +
1
2
V ar[xt+1] = E[yt+1] +
1
2
V ar[yt+1] (A.5)
Rewriting the equation (16) in terms of v′(wt+1), rs,t+1, and rf
E[v′(wt+1) + rs,t+1] +
1
2
V ar[v′(wt+1) + rs,t+1] = E[v′(wt+1) + rf ] +
1
2
V ar[v′(wt+1) + rf ]
E[rs,t+1 − rf ] + 1
2
V ar[rs,t+1] = −Cov(v′(wt+1), rs,t+1) (A.6)
From equation (2) and (7), the equation (29) can be rewritten as follows
E [rs,t+1 − rf ] + 1
2
σ2s = −Cov(ξ − γwt+1 − (1− γ)θpt+1, rs,t+1)
≈ −Cov(−γρArp,t+1 − γ(ρB + 1)yt+1 − γρCpt+1 − (1− γ)θpt+1, rs,t+1)
= γρAασ
2
s + (γρC + θ(1− γ))σps + γ(ρB + 1)σys
Therefore, optimal risky share in the presence of labor income and housing assets is
α =
E [rt+1 − rf ] + 12σ2s
γρAσ2s
− γρC + θ(1− γ)
γρA
σps
σ2s
− (ρB + 1)
ρA
σys
σ2s
(A.7)
where
γρC + θ(1− γ)
γρA
=
(
θ(1− γ)
γ
− 1
β
)
+
θ(1− γ)
γ
exp {y}
exp {wt + rp} +
(
θ(1− γ)
γ
− 1
β
+ 1
)
exp {ht + p}
exp {wt + rp}
(ρB + 1)
ρA
= β + exp {y¯ − ht − p¯}
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APPENDIX B
Proof for the Proposition 1
From the log-normality condition, mean and variance of house price Pt+1 can be repre-
sented by
E[Pt+1] = e
p+ 1
2
σ2p (B.1)
Form the equation (16) and the mean-preserving assumption, we can derive the linear rela-
tionship between p and σ2p as follows.
p = K − 1
2
σ2p (B.2)
where K is a constant term. Taking derivatives of stock share αt in the equation (15) with
respect to σ2p provides the following expression.
dαt
dσ2p
=
dαt
dρA
[
dρA
dp
dp
dσ2p
+
dρA
drp
drp
dαt
dαt
dσ2p
]
(B.3)
Therefore,
dαt
dσ2p
=
dαt
dρA
dρA
dp
dp
dσ2p
1− dαt
dρA
dρA
drp
drp
dαt
(B.4)
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Then, a sufficient condition for making dαt
dσ2p
negative is
drp
dαt
=
(
E [rt+1 − rf ] + 1
2
σ2s
)(
1− 1
γρA
)
> 0 (B.5)
because dαt
dρA
= − 1
ρA
αt < 0,
dρA
dp
< 0, dρA
drp
= ρA(1 − ρA) > 0, and dpdσ2p = −
1
2
< 0. In other
words, if γ > 1/ρA, the optimal stock share is decreasing in the house price volatility.
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APPENDIX C
Institutional Background about Retirement Benefits
In the United States, various institutions have been developed to support retirees. In
this Appendix, we document these institutions in detail. Understanding these institutions
is important to our study in the sense that they may affect retirement decisions as well as
the financial decisions of retirees. Among various institutions for retirees, Social Security,
Medicare, and Individual Retirement Account (IRA) are most influential.
Social Security is a federal insurance program for retirees. Based on the Social Security
Act of 1935, Social Security has been developed into an Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) program, which provides benefits to about 88 percent of Americans age
65 or above in 2013. Social Security, which is financed by a payroll tax, requires at least
40 quarters of working periods to be eligible for the retirement benefit. Before the 1983
Social Security Amendment, the full retirement age had been set at 65 for a long time.
However, after the Amendment, the full retirement age gradually increased depending on
the year of birth ranging from 65 to 67. Additionally, Social Security provides the option to
claim the retirement benefit earlier than the full retirement age with a discounted benefit.
The earliest age to claim the benefit is 62 and the monthly benefit is discounted up to 30
percent. The option to postpone the benefit after the full eligibility age is also available.
In this case, the benefit increases up to 8 percent yearly until age 70. According to the
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Social Security Administration’s fiscal year 2013 Agency Financial Report, for 53 percent
of married couples and 74 percent of unmarried individuals, the Social Security retirement
benefit takes 50 percent or more of their income. Since many retirees rely on the benefit of
Social Security to finance their retirement, the eligibility age for the retirement benefit can
be a key determinant of the retirement decision.
Social Security also provides a health insurance for the elderly who are older than 65
under the name of Medicare. Medicare is the federal health insurance program for people
who are older than 65 or who have a disability. As of 2013, the enrollment of Medicare
is about 51.9 million, and the elderly takes more than 83 percent of the total enrollment.
Even though it is not comprehensive in coverage, Medicare helps retirees pay for various
medical services including inpatient care in a hospital, doctors’ services, and medications. In
2011, 89.9 percent of the elderly, who are enrolled in Medicare, received some type of benefit
from Medicare. Medicare eligibility age remains 65 regardless of the year of individual’s
birth. However, for Medicare, one must be 65 in order to receive the benefit. (Summarize all
age requirement here) Since unexpected medical expenditure is one of the most important
concerns in retirement planning, Medicare eligibility age is also important to the retirement
decision.
Social Security retirement benefit and Medicare cover the largest part of retirement ex-
penditures. However, they cannot cover all of the expenditure for most retirees. Most retirees
usually have other type of income sources such as pensions and savings. Additionally, the
government provides tools for encouraging workers to save their earning for retirement. The
most well known way to save for retirement is the Individual Retirement Account (IRA) (or
401(k)). This retirement account basically provides benefits of tax-free growth and deferred
income tax. As workers save their earnings in this account, their earnings and profits from
this investment are exempt from income tax until they withdraw it. However, once workers
put their earnings in this retirement account, it is difficult to access this money without
penalty until age 59.5 with particular exceptions: medical expense, education expense and
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first time home purchase. Since the IRA takes non-negligible portion of retirees’ total assets,
the age requirement for the withdrawal can affect retirement decisions. Additionally, IRA
account requires retirees to pull out minimum amount of fund after 70.5, which are called
minimum required distributions (MRDs). As retirees pull out money from IRA account, the
money should go into one of their asset accounts or consumption. Therefore, this mandatory
withdrawal requirement also can affect retirees’ financial decisions.
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Additional Tables
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Table D.1: Sample Selection
Selection Criterion Remaining Observations
Initial Sample 170,928
Excluding Self-Employment 157,516
Keep Household Head Aged from 50 to 80 121,639
Self-Reported Retirement Status is Known 99,087
Risky Share between 0 and 1 87,186
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Table D.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Med Min Max
Retirement Status (Head)
1:Completely Retired, 0:Partly Retired or Not Retired At All 0.461 0.499 0 0 1
1:Completely Retired or Partly Retired, 0:Not Retired At All 0.575 0.486 1 0 1
Retirement Status (Spouse)
1:Completely Retired, 0:Partly Retired or Not Retired At All 0.436 0.496 0 0 1
1:Completely Retired or Partly Retired, 0:Not Retired At All 0.559 0.496 1 0 1
Age
Head 64.6 7.97 64 50 80
Spouse 62.3 8.77 62 24 100
Size of Household 2.33 1.12 2.00 0 19.0
Number of Children 3.14 2.02 3.00 0 20.0
Race (Head)
White 0.834 0.372 1 0 1
Black 0.128 0.335 0 0 1
Hispanic 0.067 0.250 0 0 1
Other Race 0.037 0.189 0 0 1
Level of Education (Head)
Year of Schooling 12.9 3.04 12.0 0 17.0
High School 0.419 0.493 0 0 1
Some College 0.211 0.408 0 0 1
College and Above 0.255 0.436 0 0 1
Level of Education (Spouse)
Year of Schooling 12.5 2.79 12.0 0 17.0
High School 0.414 0.493 0 0 1
Some College 0.232 0.422 0 0 1
College and Above 0.172 0.378 0 0 1
Self-Reported Health Status (Head)
1: Poor or Fair, 0: Excellent, Vary Good, or Good 0.219 0.414 0 0 1
1: Poor, Fair, or Good, 0: Excellent, Vary Good, or Good 0.538 0.499 1 0 1
Self-Reported Health Status (Spouse)
1: Poor or Fair, 0: Excellent, Vary Good, or Good 0.224 0.417 0 0 1
1: Poor, Fair, or Good, 0: Excellent, Vary Good, or Good 0.531 0.499 1 0 1
Medical Expenditure ($1,000)
Head 1.79 2.26 1.07 0 12.0
Spouse 1.99 2.42 1.07 0 12.0
Wealth ($10,000)
Total Asset 29.6 33.6 17.1 0 166
Total Asset Excluding 2nd Residence 28.3 31.7 16.5 0 155
Total Financial Asset 7.48 12.5 1.65 -0.86 59.9
Total Stock Asset 2.82 6.44 0 0 30.6
Income ($10,000)
Total Income of Household 5.32 3.96 4.19 0.60 15.5
Total Income of Head 3.07 1.94 2.61 0 6.50
Total Income of Spouse 0.90 1.02 0.559 0 2.97
Risky Share
Stock Share in Financial Asset 0.179 0.313 0 0 1
Stock Share in Financial and IRA Asset 0.232 0.337 0 0 1
Subjective Measure of Risk Tolerance
1: Least Risk Averse; 4: Most Risk Averse 3.30 1.06 4 1 4
1: Least Risk Averse; 6: Most Risk Averse 4.66 1.51 5 1 6
Notes: All asset values are winsorized at bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent level and deflated into 2000
Dollars.
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Table D.3: Normal Retirement Age in the US
Cohorts: Birth Date Normal Age of Retirement
Before 1/2/1938 65
1/2/1938-1/1/1939 65 and 2 months
1/2/1939-1/1/1940 65 and 4 months
1/2/1940-1/1/1941 65 and 6 months
1/2/1941-1/1/1942 65 and 8 months
1/2/1942-1/1/1943 65 and 10 months
1/2/1943-1/1/1955 66
1/2/1955-1/1/1956 66 and 2 months
1/2/1956-1/1/1957 66 and 4 months
1/2/1957-1/1/1958 66 and 6 months
1/2/1958-1/1/1959 66 and 8 months
1/2/1959-1/1/1960 66 and 10 months
1/2/1960 and later 67
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Table D.4: First Stage Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Head Expected Retirement Status 0.238*** 0.244*** 0.177*** 0.183***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
Partial Retirement Age 0.159*** 0.166*** 0.134*** 0.136***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009]
Full Retirement Age 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.069*** 0.067***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
Head Age -0.028*** -0.026*** 0.024*** 0.027*** -0.053*** -0.054***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008]
Head Age Square 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Head Self-Reported Health 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.069***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
Household Size 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.003 -0.000
[0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Number of Children 0.004 0.006 -0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
ln(Household Income+1) -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.140*** -0.144*** -0.160*** -0.164***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
ln (Household Wealth+1) 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Change Marital Status -0.005 -0.027 -0.003 -0.042 -0.005 -0.030
[0.016] [0.056] [0.010] [0.035] [0.016] [0.056]
Spouse Age Square -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Spouse Self-Reported Health -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.023***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.007]
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35960 28369 84978 64770 35348 27908
R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.46 0.45
F-Statistics 1102.70 693.82 762.98 463.24 1007.71 649.44
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table D.5: Tobit Regression
Panel IV1 IV2 IV3
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Head Completely Retired 0.054*** 0.089 0.065 0.126**
[0.008] [0.056] [0.052] [0.051]
Head Age -0.044*** -0.029* -0.038*** -0.025
[0.007] [0.016] [0.009] [0.016]
Head Age Square 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Head Self-Reported Health -0.048*** -0.038* -0.077*** 0.106***
(1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VaryGood/Good) [0.009] [0.020] [0.013] [0.020]
Household Size -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.009***
[0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007]
Number of Children -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.005*** -0.004*
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005]
ln(Household Income+1) 0.135*** 0.148*** 0.145*** 0.154***
[0.006] [0.016] [0.012] [0.015]
ln (Household Wealth+1) 0.201*** 0.274*** 0.260*** 0.272***
[0.004] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013]
Change Marital Status 0.026 0.147* 0.044 -0.006
[0.054] [0.083] [0.062] [0.083]
Spouse Age 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.005] [0.010] [0.006] [0.010]
Spouse Age Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Spouse Self-Reported Health -0.065*** -0.112*** -0.031*** -0.042***
(1:Poor/Fair, 0:Excellent/VaryGood/Good) [0.009] [0.019] [0.011] [0.019]
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect No No No No
Observations 65750 28369 64770 27908
Chi-square 6675.84 2481.63 5644.98 2464.23
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: In the Tobit regression, the zero stock share is cut off. Standard errors are in parentheses. All
standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table D.6: Channel Test - Subject Risk Tolerance Measure with Subsample
4 Cat. 6 Cat.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head Completely Retired -0.265*** -0.075 -0.056 -0.632*
[0.067] [0.138] [0.114] [0.361]
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Head Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes
Observations 8432 8432 2506 2506
R-square 0.06 0.95
Chi-square 146.34 111.43
Notes: This table shows the result of the ordered logic regression and panel regression of subjective
risk measures on the retirement status. The subsample before year 2000 is used. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the household level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10
percent level.
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